Top-Down and Bottom-Up Fear Regulation: Experimental Combinations to Reduce the Return of Fear and an Examination of its Neural Correlates by Sun, Michael
UCLA
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Fear Regulation: Experimental Combinations to Reduce the 
Return of Fear and an Examination of its Neural Correlates
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9m0079p9
Author
Sun, Michael
Publication Date
2019
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
Los Angeles 
 
 
 
 
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Fear Regulation: Experimental Combinations to Reduce the Return 
of Fear and an Examination of its Neural Correlates 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree  
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
 
 
by 
 
 
Michael Sun 
 
 
 
2019 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by 
Michael Sun 
2019  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Fear Regulation: Experimental Combinations to Reduce the Return 
of Fear and an Examination of its Neural Correlates 
 
by 
 
Michael Sun 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Michelle Craske, Chair 
 
The regulation of fear can be considered as driven from stimulus properties, considered 
bottom-up, and cognitive constructions, considered top-down. This dissertation contains three 
papers that investigated how these approaches may complement one another for the purposes of 
clinical translation to optimize long-term fear amelioration in treatments for fear-related 
disorders. 
In Study 1, a fear-conditioning experiment was conducted manipulating the use of a low-
cost, re-evaluative, and contingency-directed cognitive reappraisal against passive and active 
control conditions (i.e., react-as-normal and expressive suppression). The experiment examined 
how this strategy changed responses during extinction training and during a test of rapid 
reacquisition one-week later. In Study 2, the experiment was replicated twice. The first replaced 
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the test of rapid reacquisition with an induction of fear reinstatement. The second replaced the 
test of rapid reacquisition with an induction of context renewal. Results indicated that reappraisal 
led to faster reductions in threat expectancy to the CS- during extinction training relative to 
suppression. This was not observed when extinction training featured CSs overlaid atop visual 
contexts. Results also indicated that in one of three experiments, reappraisal, relative to reacting 
as normal, led to increases in CS+ valence after extinction training and reductions in the 
spontaneous recovery of skin conductance responses. Reappraisal, relative to suppression, also 
led to faster recovery of CS+ US expectancy after fear reinstatement. Suppression led to greater 
skin conductance responding to the CS- relative to reappraisal and reacting as normal during 
rapid reacquisition and greater skin conductance responding to the CS+ during context renewal 
relative to reacting as normal. 
Study 3 examined how individuals who express above average spontaneous recovery in 
skin conductance responses differentially recruit neural activity in structures that putatively 
implement fear (amygdala, BNST, anterior insula), top-down regulation (dlPFC and vlPFC) and 
bottom-up regulation (vmPFC and sgACC) during a test of spontaneous recovery 24-48 hours 
after fear extinction training. Results suggested sparse evidence for fear over-generation in fear 
regions, and more evidence for misregulation, underregulation/disconnection, and competitive 
co-regulation in regions that implement fear regulation. Results are discussed in terms of the 
granular mechanisms underlying extinction and cognitive reappraisal, and implications for 
clinical application. 
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General Introduction 
He who has overcome his fears will truly be free. – Aristotle 
Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent and crippling of mental health 
conditions, afflicting at least 28.8% of the world population (in 12-month prevalence) (Kessler, 
Petukhova, Sampson, Zaslavsky, & Wittchen, 2012). They are the sixth leading global cause of 
time lost to disability (Baxter, Vos, Scott, Ferrari, & Whiteford, 2014), and they contribute 
significantly to worldwide economic burden (Chisholm et al., 2016; Hendriks et al., 2015). 
Contemporary exposure-based therapies, the gold-standard approach for alleviating these 
disorders, should be the big answer to this need. It was once thought of as such, as Rachman 
wrote in 1989, “contemporary exposure techniques are reasonably effective and reasonably 
durable” (Rachman, 1989). Unfortunately they have not done enough; 24-69% of individuals 
with anxiety do not respond and 21-64% experience relapse within eight years (Yonkers, Bruce, 
Dyck, & Keller, 2003). Answers to how exposure therapy can be enhanced will come from a 
broader examination of the emotion regulation literature. 
Classically, fear-based disorders (e.g., specific phobia and panic disorder) are believed to 
develop through aversive classical conditioning (Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006).  Through aversive learning, also known as fear acquisition, an excitatory 
association is learned through pairings of a neutral stimulus with an aversive outcome (i.e., an 
unconditional stimulus (US)). The neutral stimulus becomes a conditional stimulus (CS) that 
produces an excitatory conditional response (CR) in anticipation of the US (i.e., CS-US 
memory). A maladaptive, persistent, and overgeneralized CR is characteristic of fear-based 
disorders like anxiety (Vervliet, Craske, & Hermans, 2013). 
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Bottom-up Emotion Regulation through Conditional Learning 
The strength of a fearful CR increases with learning, and this relationship is expressed 
mathematically with the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla et al., 1972). This is expressed as ΔVt 
= αx●β(λ - Vtotal), where ΔVt is the change in CR strength on trial t, αx is the salience of stimulus 
x, β is the associative value of the US, λ is the CS-US associative maximum, and Vtotal is the total 
strength of all stimuli present in the organism’s sensory array. The Rescorla-Wagner model also 
models the extinction of fear. Fear extinction emphasizes learning through prediction error (i.e., 
CS prediction of US is incorrect) and occurs through repeated exposure to the CS in the absence 
of the US, diminishing the CR (Hermans, Craske, Mineka, & Lovibond, 2006). Because it is 
experience-based, it is considered conceptually bottom-up. According to Rescorla-Wagner, the 
prediction error needed for either fear acquisition or extinction learning requires a salient, 
intense, and aversive US, as ΔVt is proportional to β no matter the direction. The more intense the 
US, the more likely its absence during extinction trials will elicit the prediction error that 
extinguishes the CR (Rescorla et al., 1972). Mismatch with expectancy provides the largest 
amount of new learning; hence, extinction should be augmented by initially heightened 
expectancies of the aversive outcome that contrast with the actual experience of no aversive 
outcomes. The extinction of conditional fear is a laboratory analogue of exposure therapy for 
anxiety disorders in humans (Craske & Mystkowski, 2006; Hermans et al., 2006). 
One immediate target for the improvement of anxiety treatment is the mitigation of return 
of fear phenomena. As early as 1979, Rachman observed that anxious patients were experiencing 
relapse, and even despite observing complete extinction of the CR in his laboratory, there was a 
return of the response as soon as a week later (Rachman, Robinson, & Lopatka, 1987). This 
return of fear was evidence that the Rescorla-Wagner CS-US association was not extinguished. 
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Rather, the evidence suggested that a CS-noUS association must have arisen instead, acquired to 
compete with older CS-US associations to influence on the organism’s behavioral output. Since 
then, evidence for this theory has accumulated, even at the level of the brain, where memory 
signatures coinciding with the CS-US representation has been observed in basolateral amygdala 
in rats (e.g., Anglada-Figueroa & Quirk, 2005; Barad, Gean, & Lutz, 2006; Herry, Trifilieff, 
Micheau, Lüthi, & Mons, 2006; Milad, Rosenbaum, & Simon, 2014) and in the amygdala more 
generally in humans (e.g., Agren et al., 2012; Barad et al., 2006; Milad et al., 2007). This idea is 
known as the inhibitory learning model (Bouton, 1993; Bouton & King, 1983). While there is 
mixed evidence suggesting that true extinction of fear may occur if conducted immediately 
following acquisition (Myers & Davis, 2007; Myers, Ressler, & Davis, 2006), this is not within 
the scope of the current work. 
Return of fear phenomena are those phenomena that describe the conditions in which 
fearful CRs re-emerge after fear extinction (Bouton, 2002; Bouton et al., 2001; Hermans et al., 
2006). They are the phenomena that putatively underlie anxious relapse. These include (1) 
spontaneous recovery (Baum, 1988; Napier, Macrae, & Kehoe, 1992), which occurs with the 
passage of time, (2) rapid reacquisition (Kehoe & Macrae, 1997; Rescorla & Heth, 1975; 
Rescorla et al., 1972), which involves re-pairing of the CS and US, (3) reinstatement (Pavlov, 
1927; Rescorla & Heth, 1975; Rescorla et al., 1972), which involves an unsignaled US 
presentation, and (4) context renewal (Bouton, 1993), which involves CS presentation in a new 
context. Under these conditions, the original CS-US memories may prevail, causing a return of 
fear. In accordance with inhibitory learning theory, the return of conditional fear represents a 
failure to access or retrieve inhibitory memories (Bouton, 1993). Broadly they can be categorized 
as context-free or context-based.   
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Context-Free Return of Fear 
 The word context within the scope of this work refers primarily to stimuli surrounding the 
CS (i.e., the “background”). Spontaneous recovery and rapid reacquisition do not depend on 
contextual features and are thus classified as context-free. Spontaneous recovery is the most well 
studied of all return of fear phenomena, and is sometimes referred to in the literature simply as 
“return of fear”. Despite the great success in treating anxious responding through exposure-based 
treatments such as flooding and desensitization at that time, it seemed simply a matter of time 
before fearful responding returned (Rachman, 1979). Spontaneous recovery is also studied when 
the aim is to examine “extinction recall”. The two terms are almost completely conflated in the 
literature; spontaneous recovery refers to the response associated with a resurfaced CS-US 
memory, and extinction recall refers to the response suppressed due to a newly instated CS-noUS 
memory. Both spontaneous recovery and extinction recall are simply measured by the CR after 
some length of time (usually 1 week, but may be up to 3 months) after extinction training is 
completed. 
 Perhaps the most intuitive condition where the fearful CR returns is the effect of faster re-
learning of the CS-US association. Rapid reacquisition (Kehoe & Macrae, 1997) is the concept 
where one can relearn associations that have once been forgotten faster than previously. In the 
laboratory, this is done by presenting CS-US pairings after extinction training. Rapid 
reacquisition is especially problematic given that for many fear-disorders, the feared catastrophe 
(i.e., the US) is likely to reoccur at some future point following successful treatment (e.g., social 
rejection for social phobia). 
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Context-Based Return of Fear 
 Reinstatement and context renewal are return of fear phenomena that depend on 
contextual features and are thus classified as context-based return of fear. Reinstatement is the 
return of fear when an unsignalled US is presented in the same context extinction had taken 
place. Reinstatement is problematic because its occurrence is not limited to encounters with the 
original US; an encounter with any sufficiently aversive stimulus will trigger reinstatement when 
the CS is re-encountered in its original context, making it a potentially common source of 
relapse. 
The return of fear as a topic has become a rapidly increasing source of scientific inquiry 
as shown on the graph in Figure 1. As of May 19th, 2019, there are so far 4,010 publications 
containing the search term “return of fear”. Figure 1 depicts the number of non-cumulative 
citations containing the term “Return of Fear” for each year, starting from the first article on the 
topic (Rachman, 1979). A three-year moving average, which provides the best fit of the current 
data, predicts around 477 (ypredicted = 477, SE = 75.49) new publications containing the term by 
the end of 2019. 
 
Figure 1: Year-by-year number of new publications containing the term “return of fear” along 
with predictions from a three-year moving average. 
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Top-Down Emotion Self-Regulation 
Return of fear may be mitigated by incorporating insights from a relatively new school of 
thought, the emotion regulatory school, built on a foundation of literature by James J. Gross, and 
later infused by empirical findings in neurobiology by Kevin Ochsner. Emotion regulation is a 
central topic in contemporary psychological discourse, with research activity in individual health 
and well-being as well as developmental, social, and cultural psychology (Gross, 1998b, 2015a). 
The Gross-Ochsner school of thought defines fearful responding based on a valuation-
based model. It argues that stimulus evaluations (i.e., what is “bad for me/not bad for me/good 
for me”) determine the emotional response. Top-down, or effortfully enacted, emotion regulation 
(ER) strategies can modify these evaluations with strategies such as cognitive reappraisal to 
reduce emotional responding. In the context of extinction, cognitive reappraisal could be used to 
re-evaluate the US as less aversive. For example, an electric shock (US) could be reappraised as 
not as intense as expected (e.g., a shock→ “bad for me” → respond in fear, to a shock → “not as 
bad for me” → respond less fearfully). Studies have shown that cognitive reappraisal of the 
stimulus is effective relative to analogous ER strategies focused on reducing the response to the 
stimulus, a strategy termed suppression (a shock→ “bad for me” → do not respond) (Gross, 
1998b; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012). Accordingly, the valuation-based model suggests that 
changing the evaluation of the US through cognitive reappraisal should reduce fear CRs and 
attenuate the return of fear. However, this is counter to the Rescorla-Wagner premise that 
inhibitory learning is incumbent on experiential mismatch with expectancy – spurring a need for 
initially heightened expectancies of the aversive outcomes. As such, if and how cognitive 
approaches should be used in exposure indeed remains a central debate in the field (Vervliet et 
al., 2013). 
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An Integrative Computational Approach 
Effortful regulatory strategies such as reappraisal come at a cost. Therefore, a new model 
termed the computational implementation model attempts to integrate the Rescorla-Wagner 
prediction error model with valuation accounts of emotional responding while accounting for 
such a cost (Etkin, Büchel, & Gross, 2015). In this model, resulting emotional responses are 
determined by experience and the cost of evaluative implementation. Cost relates to availability 
and believability of the evaluation (Etkin et al., 2015). Evaluations should be easy to understand, 
easy to believe, and quickly called upon, otherwise they are unlikely to regulate the emotional 
response. These propositions are denoted by the formula: ΔVt = Vt-1 + ρδ – C. The terms are as 
follows: t denotes the timepoint, ΔVt denotes the change in emotional response, Vt-1 denotes the 
response made at the last timepoint, ρ denotes the learning rate of the individual, δ denotes 
prediction error, and C denotes the cost of an evaluative effort (Etkin et al., 2015). This 
integrated approach might inform us of an optimal combinatorial strategy for fear regulation. 
Leveraging the robust effects of extinction training with the flexibility of cognitive reappraisal, 
cognitive reappraisal may complement extinction training for potential enhancement so long as it 
is (1) re-evaluates the stimulus to be unfearful without (2) disrupting the CS-noUS contingency 
in a way that is (3) low in cost.    
Neurobiological Support 
Neurobiology supports the notion that cognitive reappraisal and extinction learning are 
amenable to complementation. CS-noUS memories are believed to be retained in the infralimbic 
cortex of the vmPFC-sgACC (Milad et al., 2007). When activated, the central amygdala, which 
is, responsible for enacting fear CRs, becomes inhibited (Duvarci & Pare, 2014; Milad & Quirk, 
2012; Milad et al., 2007; Paré, Quirk, & Ledoux, 2004). Reappraisal is associated with 
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dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices (dlPFC and vlPFC: Beauregard, Lévesque, & 
Bourgouin, 2001; R. Kalisch et al., 2005; Raffael Kalisch, Wiech, Herrmann, & Dolan, 2006) 
which implements executive, organizational control of complex information (Dalley, Cardinal, & 
Robbins, 2004). Although they have few projections to amygdala (e.g., Buhle et al., 2014; Kohn 
et al., 2014; Vertes, 2006), they do project to medial areas including vmPFC-sgACC (Vertes, 
2006). Cognitive reappraisal may be associated with increased vmPFC-sgACC activation, the 
same region associated with fear extinction to reduce central amygdala activation. 
Overview of Studies 
The overarching goal of this work was to test a theoretical complementary strategy 
combining top-down and bottom-up regulatory approaches and to examine its neurobiological 
plausibility at a time after extinction training had occurred. For such a complementary approach 
to have clinical utility, it would need to be robust against context-free and context-based return 
of fear phenomena. Therefore, two studies were conducted testing a combined approach to fear 
reduction. The first study was an experiment that examined an emotion regulatory combination 
in adults on context-free return of fear, assessed via spontaneous recovery and rapid reacquisition 
one-week later. The second study then replicated this procedure to examine the effects of 
emotion regulatory combinations on context-based return of fear phenomena, namely 
reinstatement, and context renewal. Finally, in a third study, I examined the neurobiological 
relationship between regions implicated in effortful emotion regulation and extinction recall. 
Results from these studies may serve to validate or discourage practices that are key in modern 
therapeutic approaches. They represent an important step in understanding the role of emotion 
regulation during inhibitory extinction learning – the foundational processes underlying anxiety 
treatment – across multiple units of analysis (i.e., self-report, neural and peripheral physiology). 
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The insights gained will also test the validity of the computational implementation model that, if 
valid, can inform how emotion regulation impacts emotional learning on an everyday basis in 
contexts outside of fear conditioning. 
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Study 1: The Effects of Emotion Regulation on the Spontaneous Recovery of Conditional Fear 
and its Rapid Reacquisition 
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Abstract 
Valuation theories of emotion regulation posit that effortful strategies that manipulate 
self-relevant value can regulate responses toward feared stimuli. Learning theories emphasize 
maximizing prediction error correction in order to extinguish conditional responses to feared 
stimuli. In this study, we instructed participants to utilize a cognitive reappraisal strategy 
designed to complement prediction error correction by manipulating the stimulus value in a low-
effort manner as participants underwent extinction training. This strategy was compared against 
active (suppression instruction) and passive (react-as-normal instruction) control groups. Results 
suggested that cognitive reappraisal with extinction training, caused reduced US expectancies by 
the end of extinction training. Combining emotion regulation strategies with extinction training 
did not benefit spontaneous recovery or rapid reacquisition, however, suppression exhibited a 
deleterious effect of increasing skin conductance responding to the CS- during rapid 
reacquisition.  
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Introduction 
Exposure therapy is an effective treatment for fears and phobias and yet individuals 
remain vulnerable to a return of fear once treatment is over (Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, 
& Vervliet, 2014). Inhibitory retrieval models of Pavlovian fear extinction provide explanatory 
pathways for the return of fear, including spontaneous recovery and rapid reacquisition (Craske, 
Hermans, & Vervliet, 2018). Spontaneous recovery refers to the return of conditional fear 
proportional to the time elapsed since the end of extinction training (Rescorla, 2004). 
Spontaneous recovery implies that despite successful exposure treatment, fear will eventually 
reappear in the absence of repeated practice with the previously feared stimulus. Rapid 
reacquisition (Kehoe & Macrae, 1997) refers to relearning of fear associations after extinction 
training that is faster than original learning of fear associations. Rapid reacquisition is 
particularly applicable to clinical situations in which aversive fear conditioning is prone to re-
occur following exposure treatment, as in the case of social rejection and the re-emergence of 
fears of social evaluation. The current study aimed to evaluate whether top-down, higher order 
cognitions that reconfigure the stimulus value of feared stimuli and associated outcomes augment 
extinction and attenuate spontaneous recovery and rapid reacquisition of fear. 
Bottom-up, experience-based, prediction error correction that leads to new inhibitory 
association (i.e., CS-noUS association) is posited to be a critical mechanism underlying 
extinction and by translation exposure therapy (Craske et al., 2018). Prediction error correction 
implies that the perceiver makes predictions about threats, and the experience of error in that 
prediction (consciously or unconsciously) leads to new learning. The prediction error could 
involve either the likelihood of the threat (US) or its aversiveness, given the values assigned to 
both US probability and US salience in the Rescorla-Wagner model.  Furthermore, the greater 
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the mismatch between the predicted outcome (US) and actual learning event (CS-noUS), the 
greater potential for prediction error correction.  
Stimulus value has been studied with respect to fears and conditioning (Dirikx, Hermans, 
Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2004, 2007; Luck & Lipp, 2015) but there is no known work 
examining how cognitive strategies targeting stimulus valuations affect spontaneous recovery 
and rapid reacquisition. Cognitive reappraisal is an emotion regulation strategy that requires 
effortfully changing thoughts about a stimulus such that the value toward the self is changed. For 
a fearful stimulus such as a spider, the initial value toward the self is threat (i.e., bad for me). An 
example of a cognitive reappraisal would be to think of the spider as “not poisonous and will not 
hurt me” (i.e., not bad for me) or “having an important role to play in a healthy ecosystem” (i.e., 
good for me). This change of stimulus value regulates the unfolding emotional response. Indeed, 
cognitive reappraisal-based clinical interventions, such as cognitive restructuring, are commonly 
used in the clinical care of individuals with fear-based disorders  (e.g., Clark, 1999; Resick, 
2001).  
Despite their wide clinical use, certain cognitive reappraisal strategies may interfere with 
bottom-up processes underlying extinction by mitigating prediction error correction.  For 
example, cognitive reappraisal requires attentional effort, and by so doing may interfere with 
allocation of attentional resources towards the CS/US, which in turn impairs learning that the CS 
is no longer followed by the US (Mackintosh, 1975). In addition, cognitive reappraisal that 
lowers the perceived likelihood or aversiveness of the US may lessen the discrepancy between 
prediction and outcome, thereby reducing the potential for prediction error correction (Craske et 
al., 2014).   
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From the standpoint of emotion regulation, appraisals should change the relationship 
between a stimulus and the self (Gross, 2015b; Kross & Ayduk, 2011) but without substantial 
‘implementation cost’, or the difference between the predicted outcome relative to the perceived 
resources necessary for implementation (Etkin et al., 2015). Costly implementation is 
hypothesized to be less effective (Etkin et al., 2015).  By translation, difficulties generating 
examples of the importance of spiders to the ecosystem, or lack of confidence that such an 
appraisal would change emotional responses to spiders, would render a reappraisal strategy as 
costly and thereby less effective.  
Therefore, to evaluate whether reappraisal strategies augment extinction learning, it is 
essential to select reappraisal strategies that change the relationship of a feared stimulus with the 
self without altering expectancies for the likelihood of US occurrence or its perceived 
aversiveness, since aversiveness likely contributes to US. At the same time, they should be 
strategies that are easily implementable with minimal cost. The aim of the current study was to 
assess whether such reappraisal strategies augment extinction training and weaken spontaneous 
recovery and rapid reacquisition one-week later. We hypothesized that the combination of 
reappraisal with extinction training would reduce conditional fear responses during extinction 
training and at tests of spontaneous recovery and rapid reacquisition compared to passive (i.e., 
react as normal) and active (i.e., suppress) control conditions.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were 163 healthy adults over the age of 18, recruited from a participant 
subject pool at the University of California, Los Angeles. They received course credit for their 
participation. The average age was 21.76 years (SD = 5.78), 66.26% were female, and the 
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racial/ethnic breakdown consisted of 19.63% Caucasian, 39.88% Asian, 17.79% 
Hispanic/Latino, and 22.70% Other. Participants were excluded if they self-reported any of the 
following: diagnosed with a previous or current mental illness or psychiatric disorder, currently 
using psychoactive medication, uncorrected problems with vision or hearing, pregnant, had a 
serious medical condition, unable to speak or understand English, or recent caffeine intake that 
may affect measurement of peripheral physiology. 
Design 
The aim was to evaluate the impact of combining emotion regulatory strategies with 
extinction training upon extinction performance, spontaneous recovery and rapid reacquisition 
(see Figure 1). Participants were randomly-assigned to (1) Reappraisal, (2) Suppression (as an 
active control), or (3) React-as-Normal conditions (as a passive control).  
Procedure 
On Day 1, participants underwent Baseline, Habituation, Acquisition, and Extinction 
phases.  In the Baseline phase, participants viewed a blank screen as physiology was recorded for 
5 min. In the Habituation phase, participants were acclimated to the CS (neutral facial stimuli) 
through two six-second trials. During Acquisition, one (CS+) was paired with a 1-second 82dB 
scream sound as the US which co-terminated with the CS+. Scream sounds have been used 
successfully in previous fear conditioning studies (e.g., Culver, Vervliet, & Craske, 2015; Lau et 
al., 2008; Neumann & Waters, 2006). The other facial stimulus (CS-) was not paired with the 
US. Each CS+/- was presented for eight trials. CS+ and CS- images were counterbalanced across 
participants. CS trials were presented in random order, with no more than two consecutive trials 
of the same CS type.  
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According to randomization, one of three instructions appeared, consistent with 
instruction sets used in prior emotion regulation research (e.g.,  Gross, 1998a). In the Cognitive 
Reappraisal condition, participants were asked to think of themselves as a casting director who is 
evaluating a screaming actress trying out for a part in a scary movie with the following 
instruction: “For the next couple of minutes, imagine that you are a Hollywood star hiring 
manager. You have just gotten the go-ahead on a big television horror-drama, and are looking 
to hire several lead actresses. You want to hire the actress with the most realistic scream 
possible. Please be as objective in your selection as you possibly can. Listen carefully and select 
your next lead actress.” 
In the Suppression condition, participants were asked to force themselves to be 
unexpressive in order to prevent others from knowing how they feel as they listened to the 
scream. The instruction was as follows: “For the next couple of minutes, we would like to see 
how well you can keep from showing any emotional response when you hear a scream. Try not to 
feel anything, and try not to have a physiological reaction. Also, see if you can act so that 
someone seeing the video with the sound off won’t know that anything has happened. Try not to 
show any visible signs or feel anything before, during, or after the scream occurs. Try to look 
relaxed all the way through. See if you can fool the person who will be studying this video.” 
Finally, the React-as-Normal condition instructed participants to simply continue 
watching the computer screen. The exact instruction was as follows: “For the next couple of 
minutes, you will be presented a series of faces and sounds. Simply attend to the computer screen 
as you would naturally do so. Do not distract yourself by thinking about other things.” 
 All instructions were designed to be low in effort and to have no effect upon prediction 
error (i.e., no effects on either perceived US intensity or US expectation).  
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The instructions were followed by Extinction Training, involving 24 trials of each CS 
without the US in random order, with no more than two consecutive trials of the same CS type. 
One week later, participants underwent a test for Spontaneous Recovery, involving two 
trials of each CS without the US. This was followed by a test of Rapid Reacquisition, involving 
four CS+ trials paired with the US and four CS- trials, in random order, with no more than two 
consecutive trials of the same CS type. 
  
Figure 1: Experimental design.  
Note. ER Conditions refers to the emotion-regulation instruction set shown to the participant 
prior to the onset of the Extinction phase. 
 
Materials/Apparatus 
Participants sat in front of a 21-inch monitor situated roughly 20-inches away from eye-
level. Stimulus presentation was programmed and controlled using E-Prime 2.0 Professional 
(version 2.0.10.353; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), installed on a personal 
computer running Windows 7. Two NimStim (Tottenham et al., 2009) images of Asian female 
faces with a neutral expression were chosen as conditional stimuli (CS) (counterbalanced 
between participants). To ensure attentional capture and sufficient salience, the height of the CSs 
matched the maximum height of the screen, with the width expanded to be proportional to the 
height. 
A BioPac MP150 (Biopac System Inc., Goleta, CA, USA) collected peripheral 
physiology data. Specifically, BioPac amplifiers EDA100C measured skin conductance 
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responses (SCR) and EMG100C measured fear-potentiated startle blink through 
electromyography (EMG). Data were recorded from the BioPac MP150 using AcqKnowledge 
4.2 software (Biopac System Inc., Goleta, CA, USA), and cleaned, inspected, and analyzed with 
ANSLab software (ANSLab v2.6, Wilhelm & Peyck, 2005). 
Skin Conductance Responses. SCRs were recorded from two EL507 11 mm diameter 
Ag/AgCl electrodes placed on the distal phalanx of the index and middle fingers of the non-
dominant hand (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1990). Using an EDA100C amplifier and two 
LEAD110A electrode leads, SCR data were sampled at a rate of 2000 Hz and filtered using a 
finite impulse response (FIR) low pass filter with a frequency cutoff fixed at 2 Hz. SCR was 
calculated as a difference score between the maximum skin conductance value 1–6 s after CS 
onset minus the mean skin conductance value of the 2 seconds prior to CS onset. SCRs greater 
than zero were square root transformed to normalize the data (Levey, 1980). SCRs less than or 
equal to zero were coded as zero. To eliminate individual variability in SCR range, SCRs were 
T-score standardized using the formula shown below: 
 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑇 =
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑− 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑆𝐷
 × 10 + 50  
Self-Report. Online ratings of US expectancy were made via a BioPac TSD115 
continuous sliding dial. Participants were asked to continually adjust how certain they were that 
the US will appear at the end of the trial (“how certain are you that you will hear a sound in the 
next few moments”). Participants received 3-second prompts to remind them of the expectancy 
dial at the beginning of each ITI and CS. The values ranged from 0 = “Certain no sound”, 4.5 = 
“Uncertain”, and 9 = “Certain sound”. US expectancy was calculated as the mean rating 6.5–7 
seconds after ITI, CS+ or CS− startle probe onset. Before and after every phase, valence, arousal, 
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and fearfulness ratings (from 1-low to 9-high) associated with each stimulus were assessed 
onscreen. Data were recorded via keypress after presentation of the scale on the computer screen. 
Data Analysis 
STATA 14.1 was used to perform all analyses. Preliminary examination of differential 
responding by Stimulus-type (CS+ vs. CS-) was examined using t-tests within the Acquisition 
phase (trials 3-10), Extinction phase (trials 11-34), and test of Rapid Reacquisition (trials 36-40).  
Data for the Acquisition phase (trials 3-10) were then analyzed with a multilevel 
modelling framework (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) given its many advantages over an ANOVA 
framework (Kristjansson, Kircher, & Webb, 2007). The level 1 repeated measures were nested 
within individuals at level 2. Using the mixed command in STATA 14.1, best-fit prediction lines 
with stepwise-polynomial multilevel modelling for multi-trial outcomes (i.e., SCRs, US 
expectancies). These outcomes were predicted from Stimulus-type (0 = CS+, 1 = CS-), each of 
the polynomial components of the best-fit lines (e.g., instantaneous linear, quadratic component), 
and Stimulus x polynomial component interactions.  
We did not believe that instructed emotion regulation would impact the different patterns 
of responding expected between the CS+ and CS- that normally results from aversive learning, 
just the properties of these patterns (e.g., speed). For the Extinction phase (trials 11-34), best-fit 
lines for each outcome were first estimated separately for CS+ and CS-. Predictors for Emotion 
Regulation terms (0 vs. 1 and 0 vs. 2, where 0 = React-as-Normal, 1 = Reappraisal, 2 = 
Suppression) and their interactions with polynomial slope components were then added to test 
the effect of Emotion Regulation condition on outcomes. The React-as-Normal condition was 
initially set as the reference group, and models were rerun to compare Reappraisal with 
Suppression conditions (i.e., 1 vs. 2). In all cases, intercepts refer to the response at the first trial 
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of the phase, the instantaneous linear slope refers to the initial change in responding. Further 
polynomial slopes refer to curvatures throughout the phase. To ensure that extinction was 
achieved and to examine if there were any differences in responding by the end of extinction due 
to Emotion Regulation, a two-way ANOVA was run estimating the final two trials of the 
Extinction phase by Stimulus-type, Emotion Regulation, and their interaction. Extinction was 
achieved if there was no significant Stimulus-type or Stimulus-type x Emotion Regulation 
interaction. 
Simple-linear multilevel models were fitted to model CS+ and CS- responses separately 
to test Spontaneous Recovery (trials 34-35). SCR and US expectancy outcomes for this model 
were first predicted by period (0 = pre, 1 = post), then by Emotion Regulation and their 
interactions with period. The same approach was used to predict self-reported fear, arousal, and 
valence before and after the Extinction phase, test of Spontaneous Recovery, and test of Rapid 
Reacquisition. 
Evidence for rapid reacquisition involved modelling the first two trials of the test of 
Rapid Reacquisition (trials 36-40) predicted by Stimulus-type, trial, and their interactions. 
Effects of Emotion Regulation were then tested by adding Emotion Regulation terms and their 
interactions with previously mentioned terms. To examine how much fear was retained by the 
end of the test of Rapid Reacquisition, a two-way ANOVA was run estimating the final two 
trials of the Extinction phase by Stimulus-type, Emotion Regulation, and their interaction. 
Results 
Acquisition 
CS+ SCRs (B = 13.71, SE = 1.87, z = 7.33, p < .001, 95% CI=[10.04, 17.37]) and US 
expectancy ratings (B = 1.19, SE = 0.26, z = 4.54, p < .001, 95% CI=[0.67, 1.70]) exhibited 
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significantly increasing instantaneous linear components of the Acquisition phase. Significant 
Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed greater changes to the CS+ than CS- for SCRs and 
US expectancy ratings (ps < .001). CS+ self-report ratings of fearfulness (B = 2.06, SE = .14, z = 
14.36, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.78, 2.34]) and arousal (B = 1.42, SE = .14, z = 10.08, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [1.15, 1.70]) significantly increased from before to after Acquisition. CS+ self-report 
ratings of valence significantly decreased (B = -0.78, SE = 0.12, z = -6.54, p < .001, 95% CI = [-
1.01, -0.54]). In all cases of self-report, significant Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed 
greater changes to the CS+ than CS- (ps < .001). 
Extinction 
SCR. CS+ (B = -3.68, SE = 0.98, z = -3.74, p < .001, 95% CI = [-5.61, -1.75]) and CS- (B 
= -1.38, SE = 0.39, z = -3.56, p < .001, 95% CI = [-2.15, -0.62]) SCRs exhibited declining 
instantaneous linear slopes. Emotion Regulation did not significantly affect the slopes of the CS+ 
(ps > .148) or the CS- (ps > .263).  
Two-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in SCRs by Stimulus-type (F(1, 
572) = 0.12, p = .733) at the end of the Extinction phase. There was also no significant effect of 
Emotion Regulation (F(2, 572) = 0.88, p = .416) or the Stimulus-type x Emotion Regulation 
interaction (F(2, 572) = 0.66, p = .515).  
US Expectancy. CS+ (B = -1.73, SE = 0.19, z = -8.97, p < .001, 95% CI = [-2.11, -1.36]) 
and CS- (B = -1.13, SE = 0.17, z = -6.48, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.47, -0.79]) US expectancies 
exhibited declining instantaneous linear slopes. Emotion Regulation did not significantly affect 
the slopes of the CS+ US expectancies (ps > .147).  
Significant effects of Emotion Regulation were found on the slopes of CS- US 
expectancies. CS- US expectancies for the Suppression and React-as-Normal conditions were not 
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found to be different (ps > .580), however, the Reappraisal condition exhibited a declining 
instantaneous linear component that was significantly steeper relative to the Suppression 
condition (B = -1.02, SE = 0.44, z = 2.29, p = .022, 95% CI=[-1.89, -.15]) and marginally steeper 
relative to the React-as-Normal condition (B = -0.77, SE = 0.40, z = -1.91, p = .057, 95% CI=[-
1.56, 0.02]). The Reappraisal condition also exhibited significantly different high-order 
polynomial components relative to the React-as-Normal condition (ps = .035 to .059), and 
similar patterns were evident between Reappraisal and Suppression conditions with high-order 
polynomial components that were marginally significantly different (ps = .067 to .087).  
Two-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in US expectancy by Stimulus-
type (p = .614) at the end of the Extinction phase. There was also no significant effect of the 
Stimulus x Emotion Regulation interaction (p = .974). There was a significant main effect of 
Emotion Regulation (F(2, 556) = 3.03, p = .049), and pairwise comparisons revealed that US 
expectancies in the Reappraisal condition were significantly lower relative to the React-as-
Normal condition (B = -0.76, SE = 0.32, z = -2.41, p = .016, 95% CI=[-1.39, -0.14), but not the 
Suppression condition (p = .117) by the end of the Extinction phase. Suppression and React-as-
Normal conditions did not significantly differ (p = .593).  
Self-Report. Extinction induced a significant reduction in self-reported CS+ arousal (B = 
-1.24, SE = 0.13, z = -9.23, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.50, -0.97]) and CS+ fearfulness (B = -1.14, 
SE = 0.13, z = -8.75, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.39, -0.88]), as well as a significant increase in self-
reported CS+ valence (B = 0.87, SE = 0.12, z = 7.39, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.64, 1.10]). Stimulus-
type x period interactions revealed that these changes were significantly different from changes 
in CS- (ps < .001). Emotion Regulation condition induced no significant differences in changes 
in fearfulness (ps > .064) or arousal (ps > .440). A significant Emotion Regulation x period 
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interaction revealed that Reappraisal induced a greater increase in CS+ valence relative to the 
React-as-Normal condition (B = 0.54, SE = 0.27, z = 1.98, p = .048, 95% CI = [0.01, 1.07]). No 
differences in self-reported CS+ valence change was found between Reappraisal and 
Suppression (ps = .134) or Suppression and React-as-Normal conditions (ps = .802), and no 
Emotion Regulation differences in self-reported CS- valence change was found (ps > .163). 
Spontaneous Recovery 
SCR. When tested one-week later, there was a significant spontaneous recovery of CS+ 
SCRs (B = 5.95, SE = 1.48, z = 4.02, p < .001, 95% CI = [3.05, 8.84]) and not CS- SCRs (p 
= .214). Emotion Regulation condition did not significantly affect SCR recovery of the CS+ (ps 
> .488) or the CS- (ps > .083). 
US Expectancy. When tested one-week later, there was evidence of spontaneous 
recovery of US expectancy to the CS+ (B = 1.72, SE = 0.42, z = 4.14, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.91, 
2.54]), but not to the CS- (p = .959). Spontaneous recovery in CS+ US expectancies did not 
exhibit significant differences due to Emotion Regulation one-week later (ps > .758). Interactions 
with CS- US expectancy revealed that recovery was significantly increased in the Reappraisal 
condition (B = 1.64, SE = 0.80, z = 2.06, p = .040, 95% CI = [0.08, 3.20]), and marginally 
increased in the Suppression condition (B = 1.56, SE = 0.90, z = 1.74, p = .082, 95% CI = [-0.20, 
3.31]), relative to the React-as-Normal condition. Simple slopes analyses did not reveal 
significant recovery of CS- US expectancy in any Emotion Regulation condition (ps > .085). 
Self-Report. One-week later, there was an increase in self-reported CS+ arousal (B = 
0.25, SE = 0.11, z = 2.27, p = .023, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.47]), but no significant changes in self-
reported CS+ valence (p = .347) or fearfulness (p = .792). Stimulus-type x period interactions 
revealed that these changes were not significantly different from the CS- (ps > .683). Emotion 
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Regulation condition induced no significant differences in changes in fearfulness (ps > .155), 
arousal (ps > .884), or valence (ps > .508). 
Test of Rapid Reacquisition 
SCR. CS+ SCRs exhibited significant rapid reacquisition (B = 3.24, SE = 1.27, z = 2.56, 
p = .011, 95% CI = [0.76, 5.73]), significantly differentiating itself from CS- SCRs (p = .030) in 
the first two trials of the Test of Rapid Reacquisition. There were no significant effects of 
Emotion Regulation condition (ps > .103). Two-way ANOVA of SCRs of the last two trials 
revealed no significant main effect of Emotion Regulation (p = .761), but there was a significant 
main effect of Stimulus-type (F(444, 1) = 11.72, p < .001), suggesting that the CS+ SCRs was 
consistently greater than CS- SCRs across Emotion Regulation conditions (B = 3.13, SE = 0.91, t 
= 3.42, p = .001, 95% CI = [1.33, 4.93]). Furthermore, there was a significant Stimulus-type x 
Emotion Regulation interaction (F(444, 2) = 4.18, p = .016). Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
within each Stimulus-type revealed that the Suppression condition exhibited significantly greater 
CS- SCRs than both the React-as-Normal condition (B = 3.70, SE = 1.61, t = 2.31, p = .022, 95% 
CI = [0.55, 6.86]) and the Reappraisal condition (B = 3.87, SE = 1.68, t = 2.31, p = .022, 95% CI 
= [0.57, 7.17]). No other pairwise comparisons within Stimulus-type were significant (ps > .153). 
 US Expectancy. CS+ US expectancy exhibited significant rapid reacquisition (B = 2.60, 
SE = 0.36, z = 7.16, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.89, 3.31]), significantly differentiating itself from CS- 
US expectancies (p < .001) in the first two trials of the Test of Rapid Reacquisition. Emotion 
Regulation was not found to significantly affect US expectancies during the Test of Rapid 
Reacquisition (ps > .053). Two-way ANOVA of SCRs of the last two trials revealed a significant 
main effect of Stimulus-type (F(436, 1) = 265, p < .001), suggesting that the CS+ SCRs was 
consistently greater than CS- SCRs across Emotion Regulation conditions (B = 4.58, SE = 0.28, t 
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= 16.28, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.02, 5.13]). There was no significant main effect of Emotion 
Regulation (p = .745) or the Emotion Regulation x Stimulus-type interaction (p = .833). 
 Self-Report. The test of Rapid Reacquisition led to a significant increase in self-reported 
CS+ fearfulness (B = -0.89, SE = 0.15, z = 5.88, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.59, 1.19]) and CS+ 
arousal (B = 0.51, SE = 0.13, z = 3.87, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.25, 0.77]). There was also a 
significant decrease in CS+ valence (B = -0.79, SE = 0.11, z = 7.06, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.00, -
0.57]). Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed that these changes were significantly 
different from CS- (ps < .001). Emotion Regulation condition induced no significant differences 
in fearfulness (ps > .108), arousal (ps > .175), or valence (ps > .226). 
Discussion 
 The present study evaluated the effects of combining emotion regulation strategies with 
extinction training upon initial fear attenuation and return of fear as measured by tests of 
spontaneous recovery and rapid reacquisition one-week later. We hypothesized that the addition 
of a cognitive reappraisal strategy designed to complement fear extinction training would 
outperform fear extinction combined with suppression or fear extinction alone. Our results 
supported the use of cognitive reappraisal in terms of skin conductance responses and 
expectancies for the US during extinction training and self-reported liking of the CS+ after 
extinction compared to no emotion regulation strategy. Tests one week later did not support 
additional benefits for combining cognitive reappraisal with extinction training for the reduction 
of spontaneous recovery or rapid reacquisition, but suppression with extinction training did result 
in unique drawbacks for rapid reacquisition.  
A standard differential Pavlovian fear acquisition paradigm was successful to the degree 
that images (CS+) paired with aversive screams (US) were associated with increasingly stronger 
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expectations for the scream sound and elevated skin conductance responses to the onset of the 
CS+. Additionally, the CS+ was reported to be scarier, more arousing, and less likeable than the 
CS-. 
In the initial trials of extinction training, SCRs and scream expectancies to the CS+ were 
observed to extinguish at the same rate, in all conditions. SCRs also ended at the same level by 
the end of extinction training for both the CS+ and CS- in all conditions. However, cognitive 
reappraisal sped up the reduction of CS- scream expectancies during extinction training, 
suggesting that the reappraisal instruction enabled a quicker recognition of the safety of the CS-, 
and scream expectancies were lower in general by the end of extinction training, compared to 
participants not instructed to use any emotion regulatory strategy. Furthermore, participants 
reported liking the CS+ more after extinction training relative to participants who had been 
reacting-as-normal during extinction training. The results therefore suggest that although 
cognitive reappraisal had an effect on the expectancy to threat during extinction training, it did 
not affect the sympathetic arousal elicited during extinction training, which SCRs are a sensitive 
index of (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002).  
Examining the return of fear, neither cognitive reappraisal nor suppression induced any 
changes in one-week spontaneous recovery of CS+ SCRs and scream expectancies. Rapid 
reacquisition is a potential pathway for the return of fear particularly for individuals subjected to 
re-exposure to aversive events as might occur in dangerous contexts. Yet, in contrast to 
predictions, combining cognitive reappraisal with extinction training did not change the rate of 
reacquisition measured using scream expectancy or SCRs, and did not change self-report ratings 
after the test of rapid reacquisition. However, at the end of the rapid reacquisition phase, 
suppression led to greater SCRs to the CS-. This suggests that not only was suppression 
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unhelpful in the short and long-term for the reduction or prevention of fear expression, it led to a 
deleterious side-effect of long-standing sympathetic arousal elicited by safe cues. 
Emotion regulation effects on slopes of the CS+ relative to the CS- may have been 
precluded by sample size. Replication of these procedures with larger sample sizes may help 
uncover effects where no effect was found when comparing across conditions. Deriving reliable 
estimates of the magnitude and speed of these trajectories under specific conditions will be 
essential for understanding how to optimize the process of fear regulation. 
Our results suggest that cognitive reappraisal in conjunction with extinction training can 
be beneficial by making the threat cue more likable, aiding in the recognition of safety early in 
extinction training, and abating fearful expectancies by the end of extinction training. Using 
cognitive reappraisal did not have any discernable costs, although it did not lessen the 
spontaneous recovery or rapid reacquisition of fear. Suppression, by contrast, appears 
detrimental to fear extinction in the long-term. These results can encourage clinical practice 
involving combining reappraisal strategies with extinction training for the reduction of fear 
during exposure therapy. However, the type of cognitive reappraisal may be critical. The 
reappraisal strategy used in this study was designed to complement Rescorla-Wagner 
assumptions, but is not reflective of typical cognitive restructuring techniques that are often used 
in therapy which are often focused on some combination of self-reassurance, relaxation, 
attentional orientation, thought challenging, experimenting with alternative thoughts and/or 
reality-testing. Experimental tests of such other reappraisal strategies that systematically 
addresses implementation cost, the degree of alteration of expectations, and the degree of the 
aversiveness or CSs or USs, must be considered toward steeling oneself against fear rapid 
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reacquisition. The procedures outlined here may lay the groundwork for a larger replication 
effort, and the eventual testing of such mechanisms. 
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Figure 2: Self-report ratings per period. 
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Figure 3: Continuous outcomes (US expectancy and skin conductance response) by trial. 
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Study 2: The Effects of Emotion Regulation on Reinstatement and Context-Renewal of Fear 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Abstract 
Across two studies, we examined the extent to which effortful strategies to regulate fear 
responses influence fear reinstatement and context renewal following extinction. We instructed 
participants to utilize a low-cost cognitive reappraisal strategy designed to complement 
prediction error correction as they underwent extinction training, and then tested spontaneous 
recovery, reinstatement, and context renewal one-week later. Cognitive reappraisal was 
compared against active (suppression instruction) and passive (react-as-normal instruction) 
control groups. Results suggested that cognitive reappraisal accelerated the extinction of CS- US 
expectancies relative to suppression, attenuated the spontaneous recovery of CS+ skin-
conductance responses relative to react-as-normal, and accelerated the recovery of CS+ skin-
conducted responses after fear reinstatement relative to suppression. However, no clear benefits 
were found in terms of context renewal. Suppression, on the other hand, was observed to produce 
deleterious long-term effects on context renewal relative to cognitive reappraisal, maintaining 
fear responses over the long term. Results are discussed in relation to clinical applications for 
fear-disorder treatment and relapse. 
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Introduction 
Despite successful extinction of acquired fear, individuals who have been treated for fear-
based disorders are susceptible to numerous return of fear phenomena. In the previous study 
(Sun & Craske, under review), we investigated the effect of instructing participants to implement 
a low-cost, conditional stimulus (CS)-directed cognitive reappraisal whilst undergoing fear 
extinction-training. Cognitive reappraisal was found to decrease US expectancies by the end of 
extinction training but did not attenuate spontaneous recovery (i.e., the return of fear due to the 
passage of time) or rapid reacquisition (i.e., the return of fear due to the repeated repairing of 
conditional and unconditional stimuli). The current study evaluates the effects of cognitive 
reappraisal upon reinstatement and context renewal of fear. 
Extinction memories acquired through repeated extinction training in one context may 
not generalize to new contexts. Context shifts may include a diverse array of stimuli such as 
“physical environments, reinforcer after-effects, drug states, emotions, and the passage of time” 
(Bouton & Swartzentruber, 1991, p. 1). This perspective on context subsumes the phenomena of 
spontaneous recovery (i.e., the passage of time), reinstatement (i.e., emotions), and context 
renewal (i.e., location). Spontaneous recovery, fear reinstatement, and context renewal are 
thought to be important underlying mechanisms for relapse after exposure therapy (Bouton, 
2002). Spontaneous recovery is the return of fear as a function of time (Rescorla, 2004), which 
has been assessed in rats across time scales ranging from hours to weeks (G. J. Quirk, 2002), and 
humans at least 24 hours later (e.g., Zbozinek, Hermans, Prenoveau, Liao, & Craske, 2015). Fear 
reinstatement is the resurgence of conditional fear expression return of fear after unsignalled 
presentations of the unconditional stimulus (US) (Rescorla & Heth, 1975). “Context renewal” 
within the scope of this work refers primarily to location surrounding the CS. The effect of 
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context shifts leading to a renewal of fear is highly robust (Bouton & Bolles, 1979), and 
experimental designs have featured many different configurations, with contexts denoted by 
lettering (e.g., ABA vs. AAB design).  
Cognitive reappraisal strategies, that are often used for self-regulation, have been 
demonstrated to affect neural (e.g., Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Ochsner, Bunge, 
Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002) and peripheral (e.g., Gross, 1998) physiology, as well as self-reported 
emotional states (e.g., Gross & John, 2003). Cognitive reappraisal is often conceptualized as an 
effortfully implemented, “top-down” regulatory strategy, which contrasts with experientially-
based “bottom-up” extinction-training. There is potential for productive strategic combinations 
of cognitive reappraisal and extinction training that may more effectively reduce or prevent 
return of conditional fear responses, relative to each strategy alone. Moreover, evidence for 
attenuation of the return of fear through cognitive reappraisal may encourage clinical 
interventions such as brief cognitive restructuring during exposure to reduce relapse after 
exposure therapy. 
One potential problem of using cognitive reappraisal to reduce conditional fear responses is 
derived from the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), in that cognitive 
reappraisal that interferes with prediction error normally induced by extinction training might 
impair extinction learning. For this reason, we designed a cognitive reappraisal instruction 
targeting US properties, as opposed to the prediction of US occurrence, which we posited would 
be less likely to interfere with, and instead complement, extinction learning. Across two studies, 
we assessed whether cognitive reappraisal augments the reduction of conditional fear responses 
during extinction training, and at tests of spontaneous recovery, fear reinstatement and context 
renewal one-week later. We hypothesized that, compared to passive (i.e., react as normal) and 
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active (i.e., suppress) control conditions, cognitive reappraisal would reduce conditional fear 
responses during extinction training, and reduce conditional fear responses at tests of 
spontaneous recovery (Study 1 and Study 2), reinstatement (Study 1), and context renewal 
(Study 2) one-week later.  
Methods 
Participants 
For Studies 1 and 2, healthy adults over the age of 18 were recruited from a student 
subject pool at the University of California, Los Angeles, and received course credit for their 
participation. Participants were excluded if they were diagnosed with a previous or current 
mental health disorder (self-reported), if they were currently using psychoactive medication, if 
they had uncorrected problems with vision or hearing, if they were pregnant, if they had a serious 
medical condition, if they were unable to speak or understand English, or if they had recent 
caffeine intake that may affect online measurement of peripheral physiology. Sample 
characteristics for each study are described in their respective sections. 
Design 
For both studies, we evaluated the impact of combining emotion regulatory strategies 
with extinction training upon extinction performance, and spontaneous recovery. Participants 
were randomly-assigned to (1) Reappraisal, (2) Suppression (as an active control), or (3) React-
as-Normal conditions (as a passive control), and the randomized regulatory instruction was 
presented after fear acquisition and before extinction-training. Spontaneous recovery was tested 
1 week later. After spontaneous recovery, Study 1 investigated the impact of combining emotion 
regulatory strategies with extinction training upon reinstatement (Figure 1). Study 2 investigated 
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the impact of combining emotion regulatory strategies with extinction training upon context 
renewal (Figure 2).  
Procedure 
On Day 1, participants underwent Baseline, Habituation, Acquisition, and Extinction 
phases. In the Baseline phase, participants viewed a blank screen as physiology was recorded for 
5 min. In the Habituation phase, participants were acclimated to the CS (neutral facial images) 
through two six-second trials. During Acquisition, the CS+ was paired with a 1-second 82dB 
scream sound as the US that co-terminated with the CS+. The CS- was not paired with the US. 
Each CS+/- was presented for eight trials. CS+ and CS- images were counterbalanced across 
participants. CS trials were presented in random order, with no more than two consecutive trials 
of the same CS type.  
According to randomization, one of three instructions appeared after completion of the 
Acquisition phase. In the Cognitive Reappraisal condition, participants were asked to think of 
themselves as a casting director who is evaluating a screaming actress trying out for a part in a 
scary movie with the following instruction: “For the next couple of minutes, imagine that you 
are a Hollywood star hiring manager. You have just gotten the go-ahead on a big television 
horror-drama, and are looking to hire several lead actresses. You want to hire the actress with 
the most realistic scream possible. Please be as objective in your selection as you possibly can. 
Listen carefully and select your next lead actress.” 
In the Suppression condition, participants were asked to be unexpressive in order to 
prevent others from knowing how they feel as they listened to the scream. The instruction was as 
follows: “For the next couple of minutes, we would like to see how well you can keep from 
showing any emotional response when you hear a scream. Try not to feel anything, and try not to 
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have a physiological reaction. Also, see if you can act so that someone seeing the video with the 
sound off won’t know that anything has happened. Try not to show any visible signs or feel 
anything before, during, or after the scream occurs. Try to look relaxed all the way through. See 
if you can fool the person who will be studying this video.” 
Finally, the React-as-Normal condition instructed participants to simply continue 
watching the computer screen. The exact instruction was as follows: “For the next couple of 
minutes, you will be presented a series of faces and sounds. Simply attend to the computer screen 
as you would naturally do so. Do not distract yourself by thinking about other things.” 
 All instructions were designed to be low in effort and to have no effect upon prediction 
error (i.e., no effects on either perceived US intensity or US frequency). This addresses a 
burgeoning concern about the cost of emotion regulatory implementation (Etkin et al., 2015; 
Ford & Troy, 2019). The instructions were followed by an Extinction phase, involving 24 trials 
of each CS without the US in random order, with no more than two consecutive trials of the 
same CS type. One week later, participants were tested for Spontaneous Recovery, which 
involved two trials of each CS without the US. Test of Spontaneous Recovery was followed by 
Reinstatement in Study 1 and context renewal in Study 2 (see details below). 
Materials/Apparatus 
Participants sat in front of a 21-inch monitor situated roughly 20-inches away from eye-
level. Stimulus presentation was programmed and controlled using E-Prime 2.0 Professional 
(version 2.0.10.353; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), installed on a personal 
computer running Windows 7. Two NimStim (Tottenham et al., 2009) images of Asian female 
faces wearing a neutral expression were chosen as conditional stimuli (CS) (counterbalanced 
between participants). To ensure attentional capture and sufficient salience, the height of the CSs 
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matched the maximum height of the screen, with the width expanded to be proportional to the 
height. 
A BioPac MP150 (Biopac System Inc., Goleta, CA, USA) was used to collect peripheral 
physiology data. Specifically, the BioPac amplifiers EDA100C was used to measure skin 
conductance responses (SCR) and EMG100C was used to measure fear-potentiated startle blink 
through electromyography (EMG). Data were recorded from the BioPac MP150 using 
AcqKnowledge 4.2 software (Biopac System Inc., Goleta, CA, USA), and cleaned, inspected, 
and analyzed with ANSLab software (ANSLab v2.6, Wilhelm & Peyck, 2005). 
Skin Conductance Responses. SCRs were recorded from two EL507 11 mm diameter 
Ag/AgCl electrodes placed on the distal phalanx of the index and middle fingers of the non-
dominant hand. Using an EDA100C amplifier and two LEAD110A electrode leads, SCR data 
was sampled at a rate of 2000 Hz and filtered using a finite impulse response (FIR) low pass 
filter with a frequency cutoff fixed at 2 Hz. SCR was calculated as a difference score between the 
maximum skin conductance value 1–6 s after CS onset minus the mean skin conductance value 
of the 2 seconds prior to CS onset. SCRs greater than zero were square root transformed to 
normalize the data (Levey, 1980). SCRs less than or equal to zero were coded as zero. To 
eliminate individual variability in SCR range, SCRs were T-score standardized by subtracting 
each SCR by the mean and then divided by the standard deviation of the SCRs across all CSs 
across both days for each participant. This was then multiplied by 10 and added to 50. The 
formula for this conversion is as follows: 
 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑇 =
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑− 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑆𝐷
 × 10 + 50  
Self-Report. Online ratings of US expectancy were made via a BioPac TSD115 
continuous sliding dial. Participants were asked to continually adjust how certain they were that 
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the US (scream sound) will appear at the end of the trial with the question “how certain are you 
that you will hear a sound in the next few moments”. Participants received 3-second prompts at 
the beginning of each ITI and CS reminding them to use the expectancy dial. The values range 
from 0 = “Certain no sound”, 4.5 = “Uncertain”, and 9 = “Certain sound”. US expectancy were 
calculated as the mean rating 6.5–7 seconds after ITI, CS+ or CS− startle probe onset. Before 
and after every phase, valence, arousal, and fearfulness ratings (from 1-low to 9-high) associated 
with each stimulus were assessed onscreen. Data were recorded via keypress after presentation of 
the scale on the computer screen. 
Study 1. Reinstatement 
Participant Characteristics 
Participants were 112 individuals averaging 20.46 years of age (SD = 3.28), 76.84% of 
which were female. The racial/ethnic breakdown was 38.39% European American, 35.71% 
Asian, 15.18% Hispanic/Latino, and 10.72% Other.  
Design 
The aim of Study 1 was to evaluate the impact of combining emotion regulatory 
strategies with extinction training upon extinction performance, spontaneous recovery and fear 
reinstatement (see Figure 1). The test for Spontaneous Recovery was followed by Reinstatement, 
involving two unsignalled USs, and then four trials of each CS without the US as the Test of 
Reinstatement. 
 
40 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental design of Study 1 
Note: ER Conditions refers to the emotion-regulation instruction set shown to the participant 
prior to the onset of the Extinction phase. 
 
Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted from a multilevel modelling framework (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992) in STATA 14.1, using the mixed command, setting repeated measures at 
level 1 nested within individuals at level 2. Examination of response separation by Stimulus type 
(CS+ vs. CS-) was conducted within the Acquisition phase (trials 3-10), fitting best-fit prediction 
lines with stepwise-polynomial regressors for multi-trial outcomes (i.e., SCRs and US 
expectancies). These outcomes were predicted from Stimulus-type (0 = CS+, 1 = CS-), each of 
the polynomial components of the best-fit lines (e.g., instantaneous linear, quadratic component), 
and Stimulus-type x polynomial component interactions.  
Instructed emotion regulation was expected to affect the response to the CS+ and CS-, 
but not their essential aspect (e.g., the CS+ would not become the CS-, or vice versa). Therefore 
best-fit lines were estimated separately for the CS+ and CS- for the Extinction phase (trials 11-
34), and the Test of Reinstatement (37-40). These lines were then predicted by Emotion 
Regulation condition terms (0 vs. 1 and 0 vs. 2, where 0 = React-as-Normal, 1 = Reappraisal, 2 = 
Suppression) and their interactions with polynomial slope components. Models were re-run to 
compare Reappraisal with Suppression conditions (i.e., 1 vs. 2). Intercepts refer to the response 
at the first trial of the phase, the instantaneous linear slope refers to the initial change in 
responding, and further polynomial slopes refers to curvatures in the change throughout the 
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phase. To ensure that extinction was achieved and to examine if there were any differences in 
responding by the end of extinction due to Emotion Regulation, a two-way ANOVA was run 
estimating the final two trials of the Extinction phase by Stimulus-type, Emotion Regulation, and 
their interaction. Extinction was achieved if there was no significant Stimulus-type or Stimulus-
type x Emotion Regulation interaction. 
Simple linear multilevel models were fitted to model SCR and US expectancy changes 
during the Test of Spontaneous Recovery (trials 34-35). Regressors for these models were 
Emotion Regulation, period (0 = pre, 1 = post), and their interactions. A similar approach was 
used to predict changes in self-reported fear, arousal, and valence before and after the 
Acquisition phase, Extinction phase, Test of Spontaneous Recovery, and the Test of 
Reinstatement, including Stimulus-type, Emotion Regulation, period, and their interactions as 
predictors. 
Results 
Acquisition 
CS+ SCRs (B = 11.72, SE = 1.98, z = 5.92, p < .001, 95% CI = [7.84, 15.60]) and CS+ 
US expectancies (B = 0.75, SE = 0.33, z = 2.30, p = .022, 95% CI = [0.11, 1.39]) exhibited 
significantly increasing instantaneous linear components of the Acquisition learning curve. 
Significant Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed greater changes to the CS+ than CS- for 
SCRs and US expectancies (ps < .001). After Acquisition, CS+ self-report ratings of fearfulness 
(B = 1.81, SE = .16, z = 11.62, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.51, 2.12]) and arousal (B = 1.37, SE = .16, z 
= 8.58, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.05, 1.68]) significantly increased, while CS+ valence significantly 
decreased (B = -1.12, SE = 0.15, z = -7.49, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.42, -0.83]). In all cases of self-
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report, Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed that changes for CS+ were significantly 
different from changes for CS- (ps < .001). 
Extinction 
SCR. CS+ SCRs (B = -4.76, SE = 0.99, z = -4.79, p < .001, 95% CI = [-6.71, -2.81]) and 
CS- SCRs (B = -1.90, SE = 0.65, z = -2.91, p = .004, 95% CI = [-3.19, -0.62]) exhibited 
descending instantaneous linear reductions. Emotion Regulation condition terms were not found 
to affect the slopes of the best-fit lines to the CS+ (ps > .359) or the CS- (ps > .082). Two-way 
ANOVA revealed no significant differences in SCR responding by Stimulus-type at the end of 
the Extinction phase (F(1, 358) = 2.94, p = .087). There was also no significant effect of 
Emotion Regulation (F(2, 358) = 0.72, p = .487) or the Stimulus x Emotion Regulation 
interaction (F(1, 358) = 2.94, p = .488). 
US Expectancy. CS+ US expectancies (B = -1.38, SE = 0.16, z = -8.65, p < .001, 95% CI 
= [-1.69, -1.07]) and CS- US expectancies (B = -0.70, SE = 0.15, z = -4.77, p < .001, 95% CI = [-
0.98, -0.41]) exhibited significant instantaneous linear decreases in the Extinction phase. 
Emotion Regulation did not significantly affect the slopes of the CS+ US expectancy extinction 
curves (ps > .376). The CS- US expectancy extinction curves for the Reappraisal condition 
exhibited a significantly steeper instantaneous linear decrease relative to the Suppression 
condition (B = -0.86, SE = 0.39, z = -2.18, p = .029, 95% CI = [-1.63, -0.09]). No detectable 
differences were found in the slopes of the CS- extinction curves between Reappraisal and 
React-as-Normal conditions, or between Suppression and React-as-Normal conditions (ps 
> .164). A two-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in US expectancy by Stimulus-
type (F(1, 362) = 0.06, p = .802) at the end of the Extinction phase. There was also no significant 
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effect of Emotion Regulation (F(2, 362) = 1.79, p = .168) or the Stimulus x Emotion Regulation 
interaction (F(2, 362) = 0.16, p = .856). 
Self-Report. Extinction induced a significant reduction in self-reported ratings of CS+ 
fearfulness (B = -1.33, SE = 0.16, z = -8.55, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.64, -1.03]) and CS+ arousal 
(B = -1.32, SE = 0.16, z = -8.24, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.64, -1.01]) as well as a significant 
increase in self-reported CS+ valence (B = 0.83, SE = 0.16, z = 5.18, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.52, 
1.15]). Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed that CS+ ratings were significantly different 
from changes in CS- ratings (ps < .001). Emotion Regulation did not affect Extinction-induced 
changes (ps = .092). 
Tests of Spontaneous Recovery 
SCR. When tested one-week later, there was marginal evidence of spontaneous recovery 
to the CS+ (B = 2.11, SE = 1.23, z = 1.71, p = .087, 95% CI = [-0.30, 4.53]) and CS- (B = 1.98, 
SE = 1.18, z = 1.67, p = .094, 95% CI = [-0.34, 4.30]) in SCRs. CS+ SCRs in the Reappraisal 
condition (B = -6.11, SE = 2.92, z = -2.09, p = .037, 95% CI = [-11.84, -0.37]), but not the 
Suppression condition (p = .166), was significantly reduced relative to the React-as-Normal 
condition. Simple slopes analyses revealed that while there was evidence of significant CS+ SCR 
spontaneous recovery in the React-as-Normal condition (B = 5.39, SE = 1.48, z = 3.63, p < .001, 
95% CI = [2.48, 8.30]), there was not in the Reappraisal (p = .821) or Suppression conditions (p 
= .459).  
Interactions with CS- SCR revealed that recovery was significantly reduced in the 
Suppression (B = -6.84, SE = 2.96, z = -2.31, p = .021, 95% CI = [-12.65, -1.03]), but not the 
Reappraisal condition (p = .359), relative to the React-as-Normal condition. Simple slopes 
analyses revealed that the React-as-Normal condition exhibited significant CS- SCR recovery (B 
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= 4.98, SE = 2.09, z = 2.39, p = .017, 95% CI = [0.89, 9.08]), whereas the Suppression (p = .327) 
and Reappraisal (p = .300) conditions did not. 
US Expectancy. When tested one-week later, there was evidence of spontaneous 
recovery to the CS+ (B = 2.17, SE = 0.43, z = 5.04, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.33, 3.01]) and CS- (B 
= 0.84, SE = 0.35, z = 2.40, p = .016, 95% CI = [0.15, 1.52]). Spontaneous recovery in CS+ US 
expectancies (ps > .277) and CS- US expectancies (ps > .112) did not exhibit significant 
differences due to Emotion Regulation. 
Self-Report. From the end of the Extinction phase to the Test of Spontaneous Recovery, 
we observed a significant reduction in self-reported ratings of CS+ arousal (B = -0.37, SE = 0.16, 
z = -2.27, p = .023, 95% CI = [-0.70, -0.05]) as well as a significant increase in self-reported CS+ 
valence (B = -0.28, SE = 0.13, z = -2.16, p = .031, 95% CI = [-0.54, -0.03]). CS+ fearfulness 
remained unchanged (p = .268). Stimulus-type x phase interactions did not reveal significant 
differences in these changes from changes in CS- ratings (ps > .129). Emotion Regulation did not 
affect these changes (ps = .433). 
Test of Reinstatement 
SCR. Throughout the Test of Reinstatement, CS- SCRs exhibited an instantaneous linear 
decline (B = -2.99, SE = 1.00, z = -2.99, p = .003, 95% CI = [-4.95, -1.03]) that slowed down 
over time as indicated with a significant positive quadratic component (B = 0.64, SE = 0.32, z = 
1.99, p = .047, 95% CI = [0.01, 1.26]). The CS+ did not significantly change throughout the 
same period (p = .430). Emotion Regulation did not affect changes in the CS+ (ps > .068) or CS- 
(ps > .119). 
US Expectancy. US expectancy ratings during the Test of Reinstatement exhibited a 
significantly higher intercept for the CS+ relative to the CS- (B = 1.04, SE = 0.26, z = 3.94, p 
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< .001, 95% CI = [0.52, 1.56]), evidencing reinstatement. CS+ US expectancies exhibited a 
significantly linear decrease (B = -0.53, SE = 0.09, z = -5.93, p < .001, 95% CI = [-0.70, -0.35]) 
throughout the Test of Reinstatement, while CS- US expectancies did not (p = .076). US 
expectancies in the Reappraisal condition exhibited a significantly steeper linear decrease 
relative to the Suppression condition for the CS+ (B = -0.51, SE = 0.23, z = -2.25, p = .025, 95% 
CI = [-0.95, -0.06]) and a marginally steeper linear decrease in CS- (B = -0.42, SE = 0.24, z = -
1.77, p = .076, 95% CI = [-0.89, -0.04]). No differences were found comparing Reappraisal with 
React-as-Normal conditions (ps > .265) or Suppression with React-as-Normal conditions (ps 
> .118) in US expectancies throughout the Test of Reinstatement. 
Self-Report. From before to after the Test of Reinstatement, there was a marginal 
decrease in CS+ fearfulness (B = -0.29, SE = 0.15, z = -1.88, p = .060, 95% CI = [-0.59, -0.01]), 
a significant increase in self-reported CS+ valence (B = 0.44, SE = 0.11, z = 3.93, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [0.22, 0.66]), and no significant change in CS+ arousal (p = .609). Stimulus-type x period 
interactions revealed that changes in CS+ valence were significantly different from the changes 
in CS- valence (p = .031) but not CS+ ratings were not significantly different from changes in 
CS- fearfulness (p = .254) or CS- arousal (p = .771). Emotion Regulation did not affect these 
changes (ps > .097). 
Discussion 
In this study of fear reinstatement, we evaluated the effects of combining emotion 
regulation strategies with extinction upon extinction training as well as spontaneous recovery and 
fear-reinstatement one-week later. We hypothesized that the addition of a cognitive reappraisal 
strategy designed to complement fear extinction training would outperform fear extinction 
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compared with suppression or fear extinction alone. Our results overall supported advantages to 
using cognitive reappraisal relative to suppression and reacting as normal. 
Cognitive reappraisal induced a steeper decrease in US expectancy to the CS- during 
extinction relative to suppression. Conceivably, cognitive reappraisal led to increased certainty in 
the appraisal that the CS- is safe compared to suppressing emotion. One-week later, emotion 
regulation, compared to react-as-normal, affected the recovery of SCRs. Specifically, cognitive 
reappraisal attenuated spontaneous recovery of SCRs to the CS+, whereas suppression attenuated 
recovery of SCRs to the CS-. This set of findings could mean that cognitive reappraisal 
facilitated participants’ memory that the CS+ was no longer threatening (as a result of extinction 
training), whereas suppression facilitated memory that the CS- never was threatening. However, 
the effect of suppression should be interpreted with caution as it was not hypothesized, and there 
is no known theoretical basis for why such an effect would be expected. In terms of fear 
reinstatement, cognitive reappraisal led to larger reductions of CS+ US expectancy compared to 
suppression. This suggests that while cognitive reappraisal did not attenuate fear reinstatement 
relative to extinction training alone (react as normal), it aided in recovery from reinstatement 
relative to suppression. 
Study 2. Context Renewal 
Participant Characteristics 
The participants in Study 2 consisted of 132 individuals averaging 20.50 years of age (SD 
= 3.05), 79.66% of which were female. The racial/ethnic breakdown consisted of 34.17% 
European American, 42.50% Asian, 9.17% Hispanic/Latino, and 14.17% Other.  
Design 
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The aim of Study 2 was to evaluate the impact of combining emotion regulatory 
strategies with extinction training upon extinction performance, spontaneous recovery and the 
context renewal of fear (see Figure 2). As with Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to 
(1) Reappraisal, (2) Suppression, or (3) React-as-Normal conditions. Context Renewal was tested 
using an ABA design. Contexts were represented as two counterbalanced background images, a 
living room setting (BG1) and an outdoor porch (BG2), presented ‘behind’ CS presentations. On 
the first day, Habituation involved trials of each CS and background image alone. Acquisition 
involved CSs superimposed on top of one background image (BG-A) and Extinction involved 
CSs superimposed on top of the other background image (BG-B), in counterbalanced order. One 
week later, the test of Spontaneous Recovery involved CSs re-presented superimposed on BG-B. 
The test of Spontaneous Recovery was followed by a Context Renewal phase, which involved 
testing CS superimposed on BG-A versus BG-B.  
 
Figure 2: Experimental design of Study 2. 
Note: ER Conditions refers to the emotion-regulation instruction set shown to the participant 
prior to the onset of the Extinction phase. 
 
Data Analyses 
Analyses up to the Test of Spontaneous Recovery were identical to Study 1 except for the 
Context Renewal phase. Context Renewal was assessed between the CS+/CS- trial superimposed 
on BG-B, and the CS+/CS- trial superimposed on BG-A. A first model examined the change in 
SCR and US expectancy from trials 36 to 37 with a Context Renewal condition variable (0 = CS- 
atop BGB on trial 36 and atop BGA on trial 37; 1 = CS+ atop BGB on trial 36 and atop BGA on 
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trial 37). A significant Context Renewal x trial interaction was tested to examine if there was a 
significant difference between CS+ and CS- responding when the context was changed. If so, 
CS+ and CS- were then modelled separately with simple linear multilevel modelling estimating 
responses predicted from trial (0 = trial 36; 1 = trial 37), Emotion Regulation terms (0 vs. 1 and 0 
vs. 2, where 0 = React-as-Normal, 1 = Reappraisal, 2 = Suppression), and their interactions to 
test if Emotion Regulation affected the change in responding due to Context Renewal. Models 
were rerun to also compare Reappraisal with Suppression conditions (i.e., 1 vs. 2). Effects of 
Emotion Regulation on average response differences throughout the test of Context Renewal 
were then assessed with one-way ANOVA followed by pairwise comparisons. Simple linear 
multilevel modelling was used to predict changes in self-reported fear, arousal, and valence 
before and after the Context Renewal phase, including Stimulus-type and its interactions as 
predictors to compare the changes between CS+ and CS-. 
Results 
Acquisition 
CS+ SCRs (B = 10.10, SE = 2.21, z = 4.58, p < .001, 95% CI=[5.78, 14.43]), and CS+ US 
expectancy ratings (B = 0.06 SE = 0.03, z = 2.21, p = .027, 95% CI=[0.01, 0.11]) exhibited 
significantly increasing instantaneous linear components of the Acquisition learning curve. 
Significant Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed greater changes to the CS+ than CS- for 
SCRs and US expectancy ratings (ps < .001). After Acquisition, self-report ratings of CS+ 
fearfulness (B = 1.72, SE = 0.15, z = -8.27, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.42, 2.02]) and CS+ arousal (B = 
1.26, SE = 0.15, z = 8.33, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.97, 1.56]) significantly increased. Self-report 
ratings of CS+ valence significantly decreased (B = -0.83, SE = 0.15, z = -5.61, p < .001, 95% CI 
49 
 
= [-1.13, -0.54]). In all cases, significant Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed that the 
changes in CS+ were significantly different from changes in the CS- (ps < .001). 
Extinction 
SCR. CS+ (B = -0.61, SE = 0.23, z = -2.68, p = .007, 95% CI = [-1.05, -0.16]) and CS- (B 
= -1.41, SE = 0.41, z = -3.42, p = .001, 95% CI = [-2.22, -0.60]) SCRs exhibited decreasing 
instantaneous linear slopes at the beginning of the Extinction phase. Emotion Regulation did not 
significantly affect CS+ (ps > .343) or CS- (ps > .426) SCRs. Two-way ANOVA revealed no 
significant differences in SCR responding by Stimulus-type at the end of the Extinction phase 
(F(1, 438) = 0.34, p = .561). There was also no significant effect of Emotion Regulation (F(2, 
438) = 0.80, p = .451) or the Stimulus x Emotion Regulation interaction (F(2, 438) = 1.14, p 
= .321).  
US Expectancy. CS+ (B = -12.61, SE = 3.79, z = -3.33, p = .001, 95% CI = [-20.03, -
5.19]) and CS- (B = -10.95, SE = 3.73, z = -2.93, p = .003, 95% CI = [-18.27, -3.63]) US 
expectancies exhibited significantly decreasing instantaneous linear slopes. However, no 
significant effects of Emotion Regulation were found on the slopes of CS+ (ps > .318) or CS- (ps 
> .098) US expectancies. Two-way ANOVAs revealed no significant differences in US 
expectancy by Stimulus-type at the end of the Extinction phase (F(1, 438) = 1.18, p = .278). 
There was also no significant effect of Emotion Regulation (F(2, 438) = 0.48, p = .617) or the 
Stimulus x Emotion Regulation interaction (F(2, 438) = 0.00, p = .998).  
Self-Report. Extinction induced a significant reduction in self-reported ratings of CS+ 
fearfulness (B = -1.34, SE = 0.15, z = -8.77, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.65, -1.04]) and arousal (B = -
1.46, SE = 0.16, z = -8.98, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.96, -1.33]), as well as a significant increase in 
self-reported CS+ valence (B = 0.89, SE = 0.15, z = 5.90, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.59, 1.18]). 
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Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed that these changes were significantly different from 
the changes in the CS- (ps < .001). Emotion Regulation did not induce significant differences in 
changes in fearfulness (ps > .259), arousal (ps > .390), or valence (ps > .625). 
Tests of Spontaneous Recovery 
SCR. When tested one-week later in the same context as extinction (BG-B), there was 
significant spontaneous recovery in CS+ (B = 6.50, SE = 1.87, z = 3.47, p = .001, 95% CI = 
[2.83, 10.18]) but not CS- (p =.062) SCRs. There were no significant effects of Emotion 
Regulation condition upon CS+ (ps > .132) or CS- (ps > .716) SCR recovery. 
 US Expectancy. There was a significant spontaneous recovery in the CS+ US 
expectancy (B = 0.79, SE = 0.37, z = 2.15, p = .031, 95% CI = [0.07, 1.50]) but not CS- US 
expectancy (p = .446). Emotion Regulation condition did not significantly affect CS+ (ps > .548) 
or CS- (ps > .163) recovery of US expectancy ratings. 
Self-Report. From the end of the Extinction phase to the Test of Spontaneous Recovery, 
we observed a significant decrease in self-reported CS+ valence (B = -0.49, SE = 0.13, z = -3.79, 
p < .001, 95% CI = [-.74, -0.24]), with no significant corresponding change in self-reported CS+ 
arousal (p = .066) or fearfulness (p = .195). Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed that 
these changes were not significantly different from changes in the CS- (ps > .099). Emotion 
Regulation did not induce significant differences in changes in fearfulness (ps > .701), arousal 
(ps > .419), or valence (ps > .755). 
Context Renewal 
SCR. Significant Context Renewal was found for CS+ SCRs (B = 5.99, SE = 2.00, z = 
3.00, p = .003, 95% CI = [2.08, 9.91]) and CS- SCRs (B = 3.95, SE = 1.46, z = 2.70, p = .007, 
95% CI = [1.08, 6.81]), but their relative changes were not significantly different from one 
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another (p = 0.407) No differences were observed in SCR changes across Emotion Regulation 
conditions to either the CS+ (ps > .516) or CS- (ps > .588). A one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of Emotion Regulation condition on SCRs to the CS+ superimposed on BG-A 
(F(2, 177) = 3.40, p = .036) such that Suppression exhibited significantly elevated SCRs relative 
to both Reappraisal (B = 5.55, SE = 2.44, t = 2.28, p = .024, 95% CI = [0.74, 10.36]) and React-
as-Normal (B = 5.38, SE = 2.51, t = 2.14, p = .034, 95% CI = [0.42, 10.34]). SCRs to the CS+ 
superimposed on BG-B (F(2, 177) = 0.10, p =.909), to the CS- superimposed on BG-A (F(2, 
175) = 1.65, p = .195), and to the CS- superimposed on BG-B (F(2, 178) = 0.41, p = .663) were 
not significantly affected by Emotion Regulation condition during the test of Context Renewal. 
US Expectancy. Significant Context Renewal was found for CS+ US expectancies (B = 
1.81, SE = 0.39, z = 4.70, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.06, 2.57]) and CS- US expectancies (B = 0.60, 
SE = 0.29, z = 2.09, p = .037, 95% CI = [0.04, 1.17]), and increase in CS+ US expectancy was 
significantly greater than the CS- US expectancy (B = 2.22, SE = 0.48, z = 2.55, p = .011, 95% 
CI = [0.28, 2.16). No differences in US expectancy change was observed across Emotion 
Regulation conditions to either the CS+ (ps > .674) or CS- (ps > .202). A one-way ANOVA did 
not reveal any significant differences in US expectancy by Emotion Regulation condition to the 
CS+ superimposed on BG-A (F(2, 177) = 1.22, p = .298), to the CS+ superimposed on BG-B 
(F(2, 177) = 0.15, p = .863), to the CS- superimposed on BG-A (F(2, 175) = 0.06, p = .944), or 
to the CS- superimposed on BG-B (F(2, 178) = 0.99, p = .375). 
Self-Report. Pre- to post-Context Renewal phase, we observed a significant decrease in 
self-reported CS+ fearfulness (B = -0.37, SE = 0.15, z = -2.56, p = .010, 95% CI = [-0.66, -0.09]) 
and CS+ arousal (B = -0.31, SE = 0.12, z = -2.60, p = .009, 95% CI = [-0.54, -0.08]). There was 
no significant change in CS+ valence (p = .282). Stimulus-type x phase interactions revealed that 
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these changes were not significantly different from changes in the CS- (ps > .469). Emotion 
Regulation did not induce significant differences in changes in fearfulness (ps > .173), arousal 
(ps > .486), or valence (ps > .580). 
Discussion 
In Study 2, we evaluated the effects of combining emotion regulation strategies with 
extinction upon extinction training, spontaneous recovery and context renewal one-week later. 
As with Study 1, we hypothesized that the addition of a cognitive reappraisal would outperform 
fear extinction compared with suppression or fear extinction alone.  
When re-presenting conditional stimuli superimposed on the original context in which 
fear was acquired (that differed from the extinction context), context renewal was clearly 
indexed in US expectancy, tracking expected associative properties, whereas it was not as clearly 
indexed in SCR despite featuring significant resurgence.  
In contrast to hypotheses, cognitive reappraisal had no observable effects upon extinction 
training, spontaneous recovery, or context renewal, relative to extinction alone (i.e., react as 
normal). However, context renewal of the SCR to the CS+ was significantly greater when 
extinction was combined with suppression relative to extinction training alone (i.e., react as 
normal). These results could mean advising against suppression during extinction, as doing so 
increases the autonomic preparation for aversive outcomes when extinguished stimuli are re-
encountered in original fear-conditioning contexts. 
Our findings with regard to context renewal are confounded by tests of spontaneous 
recovery that always occurred first. In other words, pre-exposure to the CSs superimposed on 
BG-B occurred immediately prior to the test of context renewal. Consequently, due to the 
counterbalancing of stimulus presentations in the test of Context Renewal, half of the 
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participants received two pre-exposure trials to the CS+ superimposed on BG-B, while the other 
half received three pre-exposure trials to the CS+ superimposed on BG-B. The Rescorla-Wagner 
model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) would suggest that these pre-exposures should not affect the 
conditional fear strength elicited by BG-A, but that they would act as additional extinction trials 
that further strengthen the inhibitory conditioning of the CSs, potentially mitigating context 
renewal.  
Conclusion 
The current studies investigated whether low-cost emotion regulatory strategies 
augmented the effects of extinction training and extinction learning, as indexed by tests of 
spontaneous recovery, reinstatement, and context renewal. Overall, we observed benefits of 
cognitive reappraisal relative to suppression and react-as-normal in terms of extinction training 
and spontaneous recovery when the background context was unchanged (Study 1) and detriments 
from suppression relative to using cognitive reappraisal or react-as-normal in terms of context 
renewal (Study 2). 
Cognitive reappraisal was found to strengthen reductions in US expectancy to the CS- 
during extinction relative to suppression, and to attenuate spontaneous recovery of SCR to the 
CS+ relative to react-as-normal in Study 1; these benefits from cognitive reappraisal were not 
found in Study 2.  In Study 1, fear acquisition, extinction, and spontaneous recovery occurred on 
a blank white background. In Study 2, fear acquisition and spontaneous recovery occurred within 
the context of one visual background, while extinction occurred in another.  Thus, one 
interpretation of the discrepant findings across the two studies is that the benefits of cognitive 
reappraisal upon extinction and spontaneous recovery are only apparent when context does not 
vary.  Alternatively, a shift in contexts may outweigh the effects of instructed emotion 
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regulation. Although formal replication and randomization to study designs is necessary to 
support this interpretation, if true, this result may imply that cognitive reappraisal is of little 
value when administering exposure therapy in settings other than the context where fear was 
acquired. Unfortunately, exposure therapy is rarely, if ever, conducted in contexts where fear 
was acquired. Moreover, the benefits from reappraisal during extinction were only found in 
comparison to conditions in which participants are attempting to suppress their emotions. 
Whereas some individuals undergoing exposure therapy may engage in suppression efforts 
naturalistically, many may not and thus the benefits for cognitive reappraisal would be even 
more restricted.   
There was no evidence to suggest that cognitive reappraisal during extinction training 
attenuated either reinstatement or context renewal. However, Study 1 demonstrated that 
cognitive reappraisal during extinction training led to a significantly faster CS+ US expectancy 
recovery (i.e., reduction) from reinstatement relative to suppression. Furthermore, Study 2 
demonstrated deleterious effects of suppressing during extinction training upon context renewal, 
since suppression led to increased CS+ SCRs to context renewal relative to cognitive reappraisal 
and react-as-normal. Together, the findings suggest that simple and low-cost cognitive 
reappraisal-based interventions can have modest benefits for the recovery of fear from 
reinstatement (to the CS+) compared to suppression when tested in the same context as fear 
acquisition. We presume that this is because the appraised value of the US is changed after the 
reappraisal instruction whereas the value remained unchanged after the suppression instructions, 
and because suppression requires active regulatory effort that impedes attentional processing and 
implicit prediction error correction that occurs during extinction alone. Furthermore, suppression 
exhibited deleterious effects upon context renewal relative to cognitive reappraisal and react-as-
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normal. This may be due to at least two reasons. First, the requirement of active regulatory effort 
without cognitive change may additively affect context renewal to CS+ SCRs and consequently 
prolongs the recovery of fear. Second, suppression may reallocate attention from environmental 
stimuli to the self (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1989; Goldin et al., 2008; Richards & Gross, 2000) 
potentially drawing attention away from the CS+ thereby mitigating the development of CS+ 
inhibitory associations during extinction training. This may then lead to an enhanced return of 
conditional fear responding when the CS+ and the fear-inducing context from the acquisition 
phase are presented together. 
There are several strengths of these studies that are worth highlighting. First, we recruited 
sample sizes that were large relative to the extant literature on reinstatement and context renewal. 
Second, we used multiple modalities of measurement, namely, self-report ratings of fear, arousal, 
and valence, skin-conductance responding, and continuous US expectancy. Third, all units of 
analyses evidenced acquisition and extinction. Finally, our studies involved a direct experimental 
manipulation of emotion regulation that tied together two models, those being Pavlovian 
associative prediction error and emotion regulation. 
 Several limitations are worth considering for informing future work. First, the novel 
results obtained for these studies were not consistent across measures. Definitive conclusions 
about the psychological mechanisms involved in modulating fear will require evidence from 
multiple indexes. Second, our studies did not include a manipulation check to ascertain whether 
participants followed through on the administered emotion regulation instructions. Finally, the 
emotion regulatory effects upon the CS- present some interpretational difficulties. Our 
hypotheses centered on emotion regulatory effects that would reduce fear to the CS+ without 
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affecting fear to the CS-. Yet, we observed effects upon the CS-, which may suggest that 
emotion regulation changes the way the CS- is valued. From a valuation perspective (Etkin, 
Büchel, & Gross, 2015), the value set to the CS+ following fear acquisition is clear: it is “bad for 
me” because it is linked with an aversive scream sound. The CS- presumably was valued either 
as “irrelevant to me” following fear acquisition because it was not linked with any outcome, or it 
was valued as “better for me than the CS+”. During extinction, cognitive reappraisal may have 
contributed to the CS- value being shifted more towards that of “good for me” or “better for me 
than the CS+” values. We also unexpectedly observed that suppression led to significantly 
reduced CS- SCRs relative to react-as-normal when spontaneous recovery was tested one-week 
later. Although reappraisal responses did not significantly differ from react-as-normal responses 
in the same way suppression did, simple slopes revealed that reacting-as-normal led to 
significant CS- SCR recovery, while recovery was absent for individuals who either reappraised 
and suppressed during extinction-training. It could be the case that mere regulatory effort can 
have transient downregulatory effects on spontaneous recovery, as it engenders some certainty as 
to how to respond when faced with the CS-. 
 Overall, we found that in the short-term, cognitive reappraisal reduced threat 
expectancies to the CS- during extinction relative to suppression. In the long-term, cognitive 
reappraisal reduced spontaneous recovery of threat-relevant (in terms of SCR) relative to 
reacting-as-normal. These benefits unfortunately appear to be sensitive to contexts, as they were 
not apparent once the contexts were changed, thus limiting the utility of cognitive reappraisal for 
the reduction of fear in treatment. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the use of cognitive 
reappraisal led to a faster recovery from reinstatement relative to suppression, but whether this 
effect is also sensitive to changes in visual contexts remains to be seen. Cognitive reappraisal as 
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designed in this study did not exhibit any substantive costs, as there was no evidence of increases 
in fear at tests of reinstatement or context renewal relative to control conditions. Although this 
may help allay fears that reappraisal disrupts prediction error and mitigates extinction learning, it 
must be noted that the reappraisal effect induced in these studies were designed explicitly to not 
interfere with extinction learning. The results herein therefore cannot be taken to broadly pertain 
to typical cognitive restructuring strategies used in therapy. However, the therapeutic 
implementation of cognitive reappraisal strategy may do well to follow the guidelines used here 
to complement extinction learning by minimizing cognitive cost, maintaining attention to the 
CSs, changing the appraisal value of the US to “good for me”, while not changing the expected 
frequency of the US. Suppression did not evidence any substantive benefits in threat responses to 
the CS+ in the short or long term, and in fact engendered a prolonging of context renewal, 
making its use during exposure therapy a potential risk factor for the return of fear.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Study 1 self-report ratings per period. 
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Figure 4. Study 1 continuous outcomes (US expectancy and skin conductance response) by trial. 
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Figure 5. Study 2 self-report ratings per period. 
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Figure 6. Study 2 continuous outcomes (US expectancy and skin conductance response) by trial. 
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Study 3: Neural Correlates of Fear Spontaneous Recovery and its Regulation 
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Abstract 
The spontaneous recovery of fear is a common phenomenon that describes the return of a 
previously extinguished fear association sometime after fear extinction. It purportedly underlies 
relapse of fear-based disorders (e.g., anxiety, phobia, and post-traumatic stress) among 
individuals in remission. Fear spontaneous recovery may be conceptualized as a problem of fear 
over-generation or fear dysregulation. Fear dysregulation can be characterized as misregulation, 
underregulation/disconnection, or competitive co-regulation. In this fMRI study, we compared 
activation in neural threat circuitry between groups of individuals with high and low levels of 
fear spontaneous recovery (defined using skin conductance responses to the CS+ relative to the 
CS-) during the extinction recall phase of a two-day fear conditioning paradigm. We found 
sparse evidence for fear over-generation concurrently with evidence for misregulation, 
underregulation/disconnection, and competitive co-regulation. Differences in how threat and safe 
stimuli are processed and related to, and their clinical implications are discussed.   
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Introduction 
Relative to healthy controls, individuals with fear-based disorders have been shown to 
exhibit hyperactivation in the neural areas associated with fear responding, and hypoactivation in 
areas of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex associated with fear regulation (Etkin & Wager, 
2007; Lissek et al., 2014; Milad & Quirk, 2012; Milad et al., 2007; Zelikowsky et al., 2013). It is 
possible that the use of extinction-complementing cognitive reappraisal and the activation of CS-
noUS memories through extinction training might co-activate vmPFC-sgACC to reduce fear and 
minimize its return. 
Neurobiology supports the notion that cognitive reappraisal and extinction learning are 
complementary processes. CS-noUS memories are believed to be retained in the infralimbic 
cortex of the vmPFC-sgACC (Milad et al., 2007). This area has glutamatergic projections to the 
strip of intercalated cells between basolateral and central amygdala (Hurley, Herbert, Moga, & 
Saper, 1991; Likhtik, Popa, Apergis-Schoute, Fidacaro, & Paré, 2008; Vertes, 2004). When these 
cells are activated, GABA-ergic projections inhibit the central amygdala responsible for enacting 
fear CRs (Duvarci & Pare, 2014; Milad & Quirk, 2012; Milad et al., 2007; Paré et al., 2004). 
Reappraisal has been shown repeatedly to be associated with dorsolateral and ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortices (dlPFC and vlPFC; (Beauregard, Lévesque, & Bourgouin, 2001; R. Kalisch et 
al., 2005; Raffael Kalisch, Wiech, Herrmann, & Dolan, 2006) believed to reflect the function of 
executive, organizational control of complex information (Dalley et al., 2004). These areas have 
few projections to amygdala (e.g., (Buhle et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014; Vertes, 2006) but do 
project to medial areas including vmPFC-sgACC (Vertes, 2006). Cognitive reappraisal may be 
associated with increased vmPFC-sgACC activation, the same region associated with fear 
extinction to reduce central amygdala activation. 
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Several studies provide support for the above assertions. Neurobiologically, vmPFC 
thickness has been correlated with both cognitive reappraisal (Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, 
Kalin, & Davidson, 2007) and extinction recall (Milad et al., 2005). Furthermore, these cross-
sectional studies suggest that reappraisal was correlated with vmPFC activation (Johnstone et al., 
2007) while suppression was not (Welborn et al., 2009). One study found that affect labelling, a 
similar linguistic emotion-regulatory strategy, increased activity in vlPFC and dlPFC while it 
decreased activity in amygdala. This process was found to be mediated by vmPFC activation 
(Lieberman et al., 2007).  
This study aimed to improve the understanding of the network underlying fear and fear 
regulation during fear recall using the perspective of the extended process model of emotion 
regulation (Gross, 2015b). This model, which delineates the differences between emotion 
generation and regulation, along with its implications for dysregulation (Sun, Vinograd, Miller, 
& Craske, 2017), can help to better understand the profile of activation relationships during the 
regulation of spontaneous recovery. Maladaptive expression of fear may result from a confluence 
of fear overgeneration, fear misregulation (regulatory effort that counterproductively increases 
fear), fear underregulation or disconnection (inefficacious or insufficient fear regulatory effort), 
or competitive co-regulation of fear (where one regulatory area is increasing fear while, another 
area is simultaneously decreasing it). 
Regions Implementing Fear Spontaneous Recovery 
Although the central amygdala is thought to enact fear CRs, other networked regions are 
also active to implement various properties of fear and fear salience. Along with bilateral 
amygdala, we focused on bilateral anterior insula, an area that is frequently implicated in the 
reportable experience of negative emotion, and the bilateral bed nuclei of the stria terminalis 
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(BNST), part of the “extended amygdala” with strong neural interconnections between amygdala 
and insula.  
The anterior insula is densely packed with spindle neurons, which allow for the rapid 
communication across the brain, implicating interoceptive awareness of negative emotional 
feelings like fear (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Vilares, Howard, Fernandes, 
Gottfried, & Kording, 2012). This interoception is thought to feed back to give rise to fear 
salience the body, and this area appears to play a role in anxiety disorders (Paulus & Stein, 
2006), and general emotion dysregulation (Thayer & Lane, 2000). Right anterior insula in 
particular may regulate the interaction between the salience of attended goal-stimuli and the 
salience of fearful arousal created to maintain focus upon the relevant part of the environment. 
This salience regulation in turn regulates the vigilance required to complete challenging and 
fatiguing tasks and over-regulation may induce the hypervigilance components of anxiety 
(Eckert et al., 2009). 
The BNST consists of a band of fibers running along the surface of the thalamus. It 
serves as a major output pathway of the amygdala. In general, where the amygdala responds to 
immediate, predictable, and proximal fearful stimuli, the BNST responds to sustained, distant, 
and unpredictable anxiety responses. The unique roles that BNST appears to play is that it 
mediates sustained responses to contextual, diffuse, and unpredictable threats (Sullivan et al., 
2004; Waddell, Morris, & Bouton, 2006). It also appears to mediate hypervigilance and arousal 
(Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010), increased sensitization to the environment (Davis & 
Walker, 2014), stress-enhanced learning (Bangasser & Shors, 2008), and a myriad of stress and 
anxiety-related behaviors (Kim et al., 2013). It may act as a relay site within the hypo-pituitary-
adrenal axis to regulate the response to acute stress (Somerville, Whalen, & Kelley, 2010). As 
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such, the BNST is an area of burgeoning focus in the anxiety literature (Avery, Clauss, & 
Blackford, 2015). It not only connects to amygdala and anterior insula, it connects to frontal 
regions as well in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and vmPFC via the sgACC. 
Top-Down Emotion Regulatory Regions 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), largely composed of spatially selective neurons, is 
one of the most recently derived parts of the human brain (Olson & Luciana, 2008). It is heavily 
implicated in working memory, with controversy over lateralized specialization for verbal versus 
visuospatial working memory (Barbey, Koenigs, & Grafman, 2013; Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 
1996). It is also involved in many executive functions such as motor planning, organization, and 
regulation, as well as executive subfunctions of sensory input, retention in short-term memory, 
and motor signaling. Given that dlPFC is required for the comparing two items in memory 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1994), it may be an essential structure for implementing cognitive reappraisal 
(Gross, 2015a). DlPFC may be involved in threat-induced anxiety, as those who rated themselves 
as behaviorally inhibited show greater tonic (resting) activity in right-posterior dlPFC and dlPFC 
activity correlated with individual experiences of vigilance and uncertainty (Shackman, 
McMenamin, Maxwell, Greischar, & Davidson, 2009). 
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) has distinct and well known functional 
lateralizations. Right vlPFC is a critical substrate of control (Levy & Wagner, 2011), engaged to 
stop or override motor responses (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). It is also thought to govern 
reflexive reorienting (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). VlPFC is 
the end point of the ventral pathway that brings in information an executively processes stimulus 
characteristics (Lee, Blumenfeld, & D’Esposito, 2013). Left vlPFC, which holds Broca’s area, is 
linked with language production, and more recently with the cognitive control of memory. It has 
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been implicated in cognitive control processes that guide access to relevant information from 
semantic memory (Croxson, 2005; Petrides & Pandya, 2002b, 2002a). It is responsible for 
controlled retrieval, activating goal-relevant knowledge in a top-down manner, and post-retrieval 
selection, resolving competition between simultaneously active representations. Stimulus 
representations can be retrieved in multiple forms, and left vlPFC is a selector (Fletcher, 
Shallice, & Dolan, 2000; Moss et al., 2005). 
Bottom-Up Emotion Regulatory Regions 
The vmPFC, while understood to store CS-noUS memories to regulate fear CRs, is more 
broadly implicated in the processing of risk and fear and plays a role in the inhibition of 
emotional responses and in decision making and self-control. It does so by integrating 
environmental information and the goal prioritization of the frontal regions. Importantly, vmPFC 
demarcation is not universally agreed upon, and within the fear conditioning and emotion 
regulation literature, this area has been described as including some or all of Brodmann areas 10-
14, 25, and 32. These areas are connected to and receive input from ventral tegmentum, 
amygdala, temporal lobe, olfactory system, and the dorsomedial thalamus, and sends signals to 
temporal lobe, amygdala, lateral hypothalamus, hippocampus, cingulate cortex, and other regions 
of the prefrontal cortex. It appears necessary in extinction training (Madsen, Guerin, & Kim, 
2017), and plays a role in general memory consolidation (Nieuwenhuis & Takashima, 2011) 
including the type needed for extinction learning (Gregory J. Quirk, Russo, Barron, & Lebron, 
2000). Clinically, patients with larger vmPFCs tend to have lower CRs to extinguished CS+s, 
suggesting stronger and more enacted extinction memories (Milad et al., 2005). The confusion 
over what vmPFC does may be obfuscated by the fact that within the large general area lies 
subareas with different molecular and cellular make-ups. Areas of the vmPFC near the frontal 
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surface may not have direct connections with limbic areas, but may communicate more directly 
with top-down prefrontal areas. The cortical overlap between vmPFC and subgenual anterior 
cingulate cortex (sgACC) is rich in serotonin transporters, and influences amygdala and insula 
with direct afferents and efferents. Given the expanse of brain matter that is ostensibly vmPFC, I 
attempted to attain more specificity on the nature of limbic regulation by examining smaller 
vmPFC areas, a frontal vmPFC area and a vmPFC-sgACC area. 
Methods 
Participants  
275 college-aged participants from the greater Los Angeles and Evanston communities 
were recruited through fliers and online advertisements of an ongoing longitudinal trial 
examining neurobiological changes in emotional development. They averaged 19.56 years of age 
(SD = 3.43), 66.06% of whom were female, 0.37% was transgender (n = 1), and the racial/ethnic 
breakdown consisted of 33.58% Non-Hispanic White, 28.41% Asian, 19.93% Hispanic/Latino, 
and 18.98% Other. We excluded individuals based on the presence of metal in the body, a 
history of diagnosed severe psychiatric or neurological disorders, and/or current use of 
psychoactive medications. 
Procedures 
While in the fMRI scanner, participants first underwent a differential Pavlovian Fear 
Learning Task programmed in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, PA USA) 
and presented to participants using a mirror and projector system. This slow event-related fMRI 
paradigm has been widely used in prior studies of healthy and anxious participants (Milad et al., 
2009; Milad et al., 2007). It consisted of four phases: habituation, fear acquisition, fear extinction 
(all conducted on day 1) and extinction recall (conducted on day 2: 24-48hrs later). During 
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habituation participants viewed each of three CS images to reduce the novelty of these stimuli 
for the subsequent phases. During acquisition, two of the images served as CS+ stimuli, which 
was followed by a US 62.5% of the time, and one served as a CS- stimulus. CS images were 
office or conference rooms (context) with different colored lights (red/yellow/blue), and color 
order and context images were counterbalanced across participants. During each trial, 
participants first viewed the context image (3 seconds), followed by the context and CS (6 
seconds). There were 8 trials of each CS+ (16 trials total) and 16 trials of the CS-. Five (out of 
eight) of the CS+ trials of each type were followed immediately by a 500-millisecond shock 
(consisting of 10 2-millisecond shocks at 20Hz) applied to the left bicep serving as the US. Inter-
trial intervals varied from 12-18sec (mean 15sec) and included a jitter of 125 milliseconds per 
trial to reduce slice timing bias. US shocks were delivered using a DS7a constant current high 
voltage stimulator (Digitimer Ltd, England) at Los Angeles and using a STMISOC constant 
voltage stimulator (Biopac Systems Inc., Goleta, CA, USA) at Evanston. Current levels were 
determined for each participant during a ‘work-up’ procedure conducted on the Day 1 scanning 
session. In this procedure, participants were presented with shocks of increasing intensity and 
were asked to rate each on a pain scale of 1-10 (1= ‘not at all painful’, 10 = ‘most pain 
imaginable’). Participants were informed we aimed to reach a level of shock that was 
‘uncomfortable but not painful’ and ‘took some effort to tolerate’ (a rating of 5-6 that they were 
willing to tolerate for the experiment).  
During extinction, participants viewed 16 trials of one of the CS+’s with no shocks (the 
extinguished CS, CS+E) and 16 trials of the CS- image. During extinction recall (Day 2), 
participants viewed 8 trials of the extinguished CS+ (CS+E), the unextinguished CS+ (CS+U) 
and 16 trials of the CS-. 
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Figure 1: Study design. 
Materials/Apparatus 
FMRI. Data were acquired on Prisma 3.0 Tesla whole-body scanners using 64-channel 
head coils (Siemens Medical Systems, Iselin, New Jersey) at the UCLA Ahmanson-Lovelace 
Brain Mapping Center and the Northwestern University Center for Translational Imaging. High 
resolution structural images (T1-weighted) were acquired using a magnetized prepared rapid 
acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence containing 0.8mm isotropic voxels, TR/TE/flip 
angle=2300ms/2.99ms/7°, FOV= 256mm2, 208 slices. Blood oxygenation level-dependent 
(BOLD, T2*-weighted) functional images were acquired parallel to the AC-PC line using 
Siemens AutoAlign function, containing 2mm isotropic voxels, TR/TE/flip 
angle=2000ms/25ms/80°, FOV = 208mm2, 64 slices, 380 volumes (per task phase). 
Skin Conductance Responses. A BioPac MP150 (Biopac System Inc., Goleta, CA, 
USA) with an EDA100C amplifier was used to record the skin conductance response (SCR) 
during all phases of the task. Data was collected using AcqKnowledge 4.2 software (Biopac 
System Inc., Goleta, CA, USA) and then cleaned, inspected, and analyzed in ANSLab software 
(ANSLab v2.5, Wilhelm & Peyck, 2005). 
Data Analysis 
FMRI Analysis. Raw dicom files taken by the fMRI scanner were converted to NIFTI 
format using dcm2nii (MRIcroN, http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/mricron/dcm2nii.html). Data 
was processed and analyzed using FSL (FMRIB’s Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). 
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Structural data was corrected for spatial intensity variations (bias field correction) using FAST 
(FMRIB’s Automated Segmentation Tool) (Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001) and brain extraction 
was performed using optiBET (optimized brain extraction) (Lutkenhoff et al., 2014).  
Functional data was first assessed for outlier volumes (75th percentile +1.5 times interquartile 
range) based on framewise displacement (average of rotation and translation parameter 
differences, using weighted scaling (Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012) as 
implemented in the fslmotionoutliers function (FSL). Runs with >10% outliers were not included 
in group analyses. Outlier volumes were subsequently censored in first level analyses by 
including a regressor with a single time point corresponding to each outlying volume. Functional 
data was brain extracted using BET (Brain Extraction Tool, FSL) (Smith, 2002) and bias field 
corrected using N4BiasFieldCorrection, run twice (ANTS registration suite Tustison et al., 
2010).  
FMRI data processing was carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 
6.00. Registration to high resolution structural space images was carried out using FLIRT 
(Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002; Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). Registration from high 
resolution structural to standard space was then further refined using FNIRT nonlinear 
registration (Andersson, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2007a, 2007b). The following pre-statistics 
processing was applied: motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002), slice-timing 
correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting, spatial smoothing using a Gaussian 
kernel of FWHM 4.0mm, grand-mean intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single 
multiplicative factor, and high-pass temporal filtering (0.01Hz) to remove low frequency 
artifacts.   
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 First-level analyses included regressors of interest (detailed below), temporal derivatives, 
and six motion regressors. Time-series statistical analysis was carried out using FILM with local 
autocorrelation correction (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001). Regressors consisted of the 
first four images of the CS+U/CS+E/CS-, the last four images of the CS+U/CS+E/CS-, and all 
other CS+U/CS+E/CS- images on the second day. Contrasts for spontaneous recovery was 
defined as the first four CS+E versus the first four CS- images. For the purposes of the present 
analyses, activity to the CS+U was ignored, and the CS+E will be referred to hereinafter as 
simply the CS+. 
Region of interest (ROI) parameter estimates from bilateral amygdala, bilateral anterior 
insula, bilateral BNST, frontal vmPFC, vmPFC-sgACC, bilateral dlPFC, and bilateral vlPFC 
were extracted from the aversive conditioning fMRI task (see Figures 11-17). The bilateral 
amygdala ROI, bilateral anterior insula, and bilateral vmPFC-sgACC were defined through 
masks from the Harvard-Oxford MNI probabilistic atlas. ROIs for frontal vmPFC (-2, 56, -14), 
left dlPFC (-36, 44, 22), right dlPFC (34, 44, 32), left vlPFC (-48, 16, 6), and right vlPFC (34, 
44, 32) were defined as 5mm spheres centered on coordinates from the most recent meta-analysis 
on fear conditioning by Fullana and colleagues (2016). The bilateral BNST mask was created 
from a 7T gradient spin echo (GRASE) MRI image (Avery et al., 2015). 
SCR Analysis. SCRs greater than zero were square root transformed to normalize the 
data (Levey, 1980). SCRs less than or equal to zero were coded as zero. To eliminate individual 
variability in SCR range, SCRs were T-score standardized using the following formula: 
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑇 =
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 −  𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑆𝐷
 × 10 + 50 
Spontaneous recovery was operationalized through the SCR of the first four CS+ trials averaged 
minus the first four CS- trials averaged. 
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Preliminary Analyses 
193 participants exhibited interpretable SCRs, and 3 of these participants were removed 
due to problems with fMRI data, leaving a final n of 190. SCRs to the CS+ and CS- were 
estimated with best-fit curvilinear models to check for fear acquisition, fear extinction, and the 
return of fear. As expected (see Figure 10), fear conditioning differentiated the CS+ from the CS- 
in SCRs during the Acquisition phase (Stimulus-type x Trial: B = -6.40, SE = 1.04, p < .001) and 
SCRs to the CS+ were extinguished by the end of the Extinction phase (95% confidence 
intervals between CS+ and CS- begin overlapping by trial 27). SCR spontaneous recovery during 
the Test of Spontaneous Recovery was not significantly induced on average (M = -0.40, SD = 
7.12, t(189) = -0.67, p = .749). Seventy-three (38.42%) participants did exhibit spontaneous 
recovery and 52 (27.37%) exhibited higher-than-average spontaneous recovery (M = 8.73, SD = 
5.04, t(51) = 12.50, p < .001). Descriptive statistics are provided on Table 1, comparing the 
group of individuals exhibiting higher-than-average SCR spontaneous recovery (hereinafter the 
high SCR spontaneous recovery group) from others (hereinafter the low SCR spontaneous 
recovery group) using t-tests and chi-square tests of equivalence.    
  
Figure 2: Predicted skin conductance responding during Acquisition, Extinction, and Test of 
Spontaneous Recovery phases. 
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Table 1 
Individuals Exhibiting Low and High SCR Spontaneous Recovery 
Demographic Characteristic Low SCR Spontaneous 
Recovery (n = 138) 
High SCR Spontaneous 
Recovery (n = 52) 
t / χ2 p 
Gender    χ2(1) = 5.31  .021* 
Male 37 (26.81%) 23 (44.23%)   
Female 101 (73.19%) 29 (55.77%)   
     
     
Mean Age (SD) 19.20 (0.50) 19.13 (0.61) t = 0.82 .208 
Race/ethnicity 
 
 χ2(6) = 9.40  .153 
White, non-Hispanic 46 (33.33%) 15 (28.85%)   
Hispanic White 32 (23.19%) 10 (19.23%)   
Asian 33 (23.91%) 23 (44.23%)   
Black 14 (10.14%) 2 (3.85%)   
Native 2 (1.45%) 0 (0.00%)   
Multiracial 10 (7.25%) 2 (3.85%)   
None endorsed by choice 1 (0.72%) 0 (0.00%)   
 
Path Modelling Specification Procedures 
Path modelling was conducted with the STATA 14.1 sem command to address whether 
top-down or bottom-up control regions predicted activity in regions that implement fear 
spontaneous recovery. This provided estimates of direct and indirect regulatory paths, as well as 
total effects from the activity of control ROIs on limbic spontaneous recovery. The totality of the 
regulatory activations may lead to complementary mediation, competitive mediation, indirect-
only mediation, direct-only mediation, or non-mediation (Zhao, Lynch Jr, & Chen, 2010) 
between top-down and bottom-up regulatory mechanisms. Additionally, path modelling provides 
estimates of covariances between region categories (i.e., spontaneous recovery regions, top-down 
regulatory regions, bottom-up regulatory regions). SEM disattenuates parameter estimates from 
measurement error (Ullman & Bentler, 2003), allowing a more accurate assessment of the 
relationship between the fear response and its putative neural mechanisms. Estimates were 
computed using maximum-likelihood. 
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To understand the emotion regulation-spontaneous recovery activation network, a 
saturated configural path model was first fit for the sample, and then re-fit with a grouping 
variable, clustering individuals by low and high SCR spontaneous recovery (0 = average to lower 
than average SCR spontaneous recovery; 1 = higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery). 
This path model included top-down regulatory ROI activity during exposure to CS+/CS- as 
exogenous variables (8 variables), bottom-up regulatory ROI activity during exposure to 
CS+/CS- as intermediary variables (4 variables), and spontaneous recovery activity in each 
limbic ROI as endogenous variables (6 variables). The intermediary variables are predicted by 
the exogenous variables and the endogenous variables are predicted by both exogenous and 
intermediary variables. This model had 189 parameters estimated per group (104 directed paths, 
28 exogenous covariances from 8 exogenous means and their variances, and 21 error covariances 
from 10 intercepts and their error variances). 
Fit indices are not available for just-identified configural models, yet such models may 
not fit well, so we explored the effects of testing group invariance by constraining classes of 
paths and examining the fit after imposing constraints relative to the configural model with all 
paths free-to-vary. This involved testing models after constraining (a.) the directed paths from 
top-down to bottom-up regulatory activity, (b.) the directed paths from top-down regulatory 
activity to spontaneous recovery, (c.) the directed paths from bottom-up regulatory activity to 
spontaneous recovery, (d.) the bottom-up regulatory covariances, (e.) the spontaneous recovery 
covariances, (f.) the top-down regulatory covariances, (g.) the top-down regulatory activity 
means, (h.) the bottom-up regulatory activity intercepts, and (i.) the spontaneous recovery 
intercepts. Goodness of fit was determined using the chi-square test of the difference between the 
constrained and the configural model, the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and Root Mean Square 
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Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Population level goodness-of-fit was estimated with the 90% 
Confidence Interval of the RMSEA. Adequate fit was defined as a non-significant chi-square 
difference, a TLI above .90 and a RMSEA under .08. Path classes were freed if constraining 
them led to poor model fit. Variance explained in each model was quantified with the Coefficient 
of Determination (CD). A final model was chosen by constraining all classes of paths that 
maintained good fit after being constrained.  
Paths that remained unconstrained across groups were tested for group differences with a 
univariate Wald test. Direct paths for the high SCR spontaneous recovery group estimated from 
regulatory areas to spontaneous recovery were interpreted from an extended process model 
viewpoint of emotion dysregulation (Gross, 2015b). These direct paths, when significantly 
different from the respective paths of the comparison group, were interpreted as emotion 
misregulation for significantly positive paths that were greater than comparison paths, emotion 
underregulation for significantly positive paths of that were also significantly smaller in 
magnitude, and emotion non-regulation/regulatory-disconnection for paths that were no longer 
significant when compared with comparison paths. 95% confidence intervals were inspected 
within path classes to explore how paths compared to one another. 
Results 
Tests of Invariance 
The configural model, after including the grouping variable, increased the CD from .706 
to .805. Direct paths from top-down to bottom-up regulatory activity (χ2(32) = 39.32, p = .175, 
TLI = .922, RMSEA = .049, 90% CI = (.00, .10)), mean (χ2(8) = 5.22, p = .734, TLI = 1.118, 
RMSEA = .00, 90% CI = (.00, .09)) and variance (χ2(8) = 7.32, p = .502, TLI = 1.029, RMSEA 
= .00, 90% CI = (.00, .11)) estimates of top-down regulatory activity, intercept estimates of 
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bottom-up regulatory activity (χ2(4) = 4.82, p = .306, TLI = .931, RMSEA = .046, 90% CI = 
(.00, .168)), and variance estimates of spontaneous recovery (χ2(6) = 4.75, p = .576, TLI = 1.070, 
RMSEA = .00, 90% CI = (.00, .12)) could be constrained without sacrificing model fit. When 
concurrently constrained, the final model fit well (χ2(58) = 59.01, p = .438, TLI = .994, RMSEA 
= .014, 90% CI = (.00, .07)) and increased the CD to .814. All tests of invariance and their model 
fit statistics are shown on Table 2. 
Table 2 
Tests of invariance after constraining categories of paths to be equal 
Model χ2 df p for χ2 TLI RMSEA 90% CI CD 
Saturated model without grouping variable 0 0 . 1.00 .00 (.00, .00) .706 
Configural model with grouping variable 0 0 . 1.00 .00 (.00, .00) .805 
Equal Paths (top-down → bottom-up) 39.322 32 .175 .922 .049 (.00, .095) .804 
Equal Paths (top-down → spontaneous recovery) 72.700 48 .012 .826 .074 (.035, .107) .774 
Equal Paths (bottom-up → spontaneous recovery) 34.499 24 .076 .852 .068 (.00,.115) .797 
Equal Disturbance Variances (bottom-up) 14.329 4 .006 .125 .165 (.078, .261) .826 
Equal Disturbance Variances/Covariances (bottom-up) 19.519 10 .034 .678 .100 (.027, .166) .839 
Equal Disturbance Variances (spontaneous recovery) 4.752 6 .576 1.070 .00 (.00, .117) .813 
Equal Disturbance Variances/Covariances  
(spontaneous recovery) 
29.425 21 .104 .864 .065 (.00,.116) .821 
Equal Exogenous Variances (top-down) 7.321 8 .502 1.029 .00 (.00, .114) .810 
Equal Exogenous Variances/Covariances (top-down) 52.332 36 .038 .846 .069 (.017, .108) .826 
Equal Means (top-down) 5.220 8 .734 1.118 .00 (.00, .088) .806 
Equal Intercepts (bottom-up) 4.819 4 .306 .931 .046 (.00, .168) .805 
Equal Intercepts (spontaneous recovery) 10.271 6 .114 .759 .087 (.00, .174) .804 
Final Model1 59.010 58 .438 .994 .014 (.00, .065) .814 
Note. Rows in bold signify path categories that may be constrained without significantly 
sacrificing model fit.  
1The final model consists of the configural model while constraining all paths in bold. 
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Means and Intercepts 
 
Figure 3: Region-of-interest activity at the test of spontaneous recovery 
Note. dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, vlPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, vmPFC: 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, sgACC: subgenual anterior cingulate, BNST: bed nucleus of the 
stria terminalis. Bars are differentiated between the Low and the High Spontaneous Recovery 
groups if significantly different.  
 
Across the entire sample, mean activity of top-down regulatory areas were all 
significantly active to the CS+ and CS- (ps > .003). Moreover, inspecting the 95% confidence 
intervals revealed that mean right vlPFC activity to the CS- (95% CI = [0.16, 0.24]) was 
significantly greater than mean left vlPFC (95% CI = [0.04, 0.28]) as well as bilateral dlPFC 
(right: 95% CI = [0.07, 0.34]); left: 95% CI = [0.04, 0.28]) activity to the CS+. The variability of 
top-down regulatory activity were not observed to be significantly different across activations. 
Intercepts of bottom-up regulatory activity evidenced significant frontal vmPFC and 
vmPFC-sgACC deactivations to the CS+ and CS- (ps < .002). Confidence intervals revealing 
that frontal vmPFC evidenced significantly greater deactivations to the CS+ (95% CI = [-0.21, -
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0.06]) and CS- (95% CI = [-0.16, -0.03]) relative to vmPFC-sgACC deactivations to CS+ (95% 
CI = [-0.51, -0.22]) and CS- (95% CI = [-0.43, -0.19]). Confidence intervals of bottom-up 
regulatory activity revealed that frontal vmPFC activity to the CS+ (95% CI = [0.61, 0.92]) and 
the CS- (95% CI = [0.41, 0.61]) was significantly more variable than vmPFC-sgACC activity to 
the CS+ (95% CI = [0.16, 0.24]) and CS- (95% CI = [0.11, 0.16]). 
Neural spontaneous recovery intercepts were not significant for any region (ps > .232), 
which is consistent with the sample’s absence of significant expressed spontaneous recovery in 
SCRs. Individuals who did exhibit higher levels of SCR spontaneous recovery exhibited 
relatively higher left amygdalar spontaneous recovery intercept than the rest of the sample (Wald 
χ2 = 4.59, p = .032), although the estimated activity was not significant from zero (B = 0.14, SE 
= 0.09, z = 1.51, p = 0.13, 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.33]). Confidence intervals of the variability of 
limbic ROI spontaneous recovery intercepts revealed that the left BNST spontaneous recovery 
intercept (95% CI = [0.41, 0.61]) was significantly more variable than the right amygdalar 
spontaneous recovery intercept (95% CI = [0.19, 0.28]), and that variability of the right BNST 
spontaneous recovery intercept (95% CI = [0.34, 0.52]) was significantly greater than that of 
bilateral amygdalar spontaneous recovery (left amygdala: 95% CI = [0.21, 0.32]). 
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Structural Covariances 
 
Figure 4: Top-down region-of-interest activity correlations at the test of spontaneous recovery 
Note. dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, vlPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Bars are 
differentiated between the Low and the High Spontaneous Recovery groups if significantly 
different. Low vs. High Spontaneous Recovery bars for left dlPFC<>right vlPFC activity are for 
the CS-. 
 
 Between Top-Down Regulatory Regions. For the entire sample, all top-down regulatory 
activity to the CS+ (ps < .001) and CS- (ps < .011) were significantly positively correlated. 
Cross-region correlations of activity between CS+ and CS- were also positive and significant (ps 
< .034) with exceptions of correlations between right dlPFC to the CS+ and right vlPFC to the 
CS- (p = .135), between right dlPFC to the CS- right vlPFC to the CS+ (p = .076), between right 
dlPFC activity to the CS- and left vlPFC to the CS+ (p = .303), and between right vlPFC to the 
CS- and left vlPFC to the CS+ (p = .063).  
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Individuals with higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery exhibited correlations 
between left dlPFC to the CS- and right vlPFC to the CS+ (Wald χ2 = 4.19, p = .041), between 
left dlPFC to the CS- and right vlPFC to the CS- (Wald χ2 = 4.86, p = .028), and between left 
vlPFC to the CSE and right vlpfc to the CS- (Wald χ2 = 6.06, p = .014), that significantly 
differed from those who did not exhibit higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery such that 
these correlations were no longer significant (ps > .328). At the same time, right vlPFC activity 
between the CS+ and CS- was significantly increased (low group: B = 0.32, SE = 0.08, z = 4.18, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.47]; high group: B = 0.44, SE = 0.12, z = 3.70, p < 0.001, 95% CI = 
[0.21, 0.68]) for individuals with higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery (Wald χ2 = 
6.56, p = .010). 
 
Figure 5: Bottom-up region-of-interest activity correlations at the test of spontaneous recovery 
Note. vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex, sgACC: subgenual anterior cingulate. Low vs. 
High Spontaneous Recovery bars for vmPFC-sgACC<>frontal vmPFC activity are for the CS-. 
 
 Between Bottom-Up Regulatory Regions. All bottom-up regulatory activity to the CS+ 
(p < .001), CS- (p < .001), and between the CS+ and CS- (ps < .037) were positively correlated. 
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Confidence intervals revealed that the correlation between frontal vmPFC and vmPFC-sgACC 
activity to the CS+ (95% CI = [0.18, 0.31]) was significantly greater than all other correlations 
between bottom-up regulatory activity (95% CI upper bound < 0.17) except between frontal 
vmPFC activity to the CS+ and CS- (95% CI = [0.11, 0.29]). Frontal vmPFC activity to the CS+ 
and CS- was in turn significantly greater than correlations between vmPFC-sgACC activity to 
the CS+ and CS- (95% CI = [0.03, 0.07]), and between vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS+ and 
frontal vmPFC activity to the CS- (95% CI = [0.003, 0.09]). 
Individuals with higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery exhibited a significantly 
reduced correlation (Wald χ2 = 7.94, p = .005) between vmPFC-sgACC activity and frontal 
vmPFC activity to the CS- (low group: B = 0.16, SE = 0.03, z = 5.64, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.10, 
0.21]; high group: B = 0.05, SE = 0.02, z = 2.17, p = 0.03, 95% CI = [0.005, 0.09]). 
 
Figure 6: Spontaneous recovery region-of-interest activity correlations. 
Note. Ant: anterior. Bars are differentiated between the Low and the High Spontaneous Recovery 
groups if significantly different. 
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Between Regions Implementing Spontaneous Recovery. All implementations of neural 
spontaneous recovery types evidenced positive correlations (e.g., between proximal fear, 
sustained fear, and interoception; ps < .033), although significant correlations were not 
evidenced between every region. Those exceptions were for correlations between left amygdala 
and right anterior insula (p = .054), left amygdala and right BNST (p = .333), right amygdala and 
left BNST (p = .149), right amygdala and right BNST (p = .143), and left anterior insula and 
right BNST (p = .056). The correlation between left and right BNST spontaneous recovery (95% 
CI = [0.15, 0.28]) was significantly greater than all other bivariate correlations of spontaneous 
recovery (95% CI lower bound < 0.14) except for the correlation between left and right 
amygdalar spontaneous recovery (95% CI = [0.08, 0.16]). The correlation between left and right 
amygdalar spontaneous recovery was in turn significantly greater than correlations between left 
amygdala and right anterior insula (95% CI = [-0.001, 0.07]), left amygdala and right BNST 
(95% CI = [-0.02, 0.07]), right amygdala and left BNST (95% CI = [-0.01, 0.07]) and, right 
amygdala and right BNST (95% CI = [-0.01, 0.08]). 
Individuals with higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery exhibited a positive 
relationship between right anterior insular and right BNST spontaneous recovery (B = 0.11, SE = 
0.04, z = 2.54, p = 0.011, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.20]), which was statistically different from (Wald χ2 
= 5.01, p = .025) and not observed significantly in others (p = .366). However, the relationship 
between left amygdalar and left anterior insular spontaneous recovery was reduced to non-
significance (p = .937), which was also significantly different from others (Wald χ2  = 4.46, p 
= .034). 
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Direct Paths 
 
Figure 7: Direct paths from top-down to bottom-up activity in regions-of-interest. 
Note. dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, vlPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, vmPFC: 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, sgACC: subgenual anterior cingulate. 
 
Top-Down to Bottom-Up Regulatory Activity. Greater left vlPFC activity to the CS- 
predicted increased frontal vmPFC activity to the CS- (B = 0.27, SE = .08, z = 3.27, p = .001, 
95% CI = [0.11, 0.43]). Greater right dlPFC activity to the CS- predicted reduced frontal vmPFC 
activity to the CS+ (B = -0.24, SE = .10, z = -2.40, p = .016, 95% CI = [-0.44, -0.04]).  
Greater left dlPFC (B = -0.16, SE = .04, z = 3.69, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.25]) and 
left vlPFC (B = 0.09, SE = .04, z = 2.12, p = .034, 95% CI = [0.01, -0.17]) activity to the CS- 
predicted increased vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS-. Greater right dlPFC (B = -0.10, SE = .04, 
z = -2.33, p = .020, 95% CI = [-0.18, -0.02]) and left vlPFC (B = -0.10, SE = .04, z = -2.42, p 
= .016, 95% CI = [-0.19, -0.020]) activity to the CS+ predicted reduced vmPFC-sgACC activity 
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to the CS-. Activity in top-down regulatory regions did not significantly predict any other 
activity in bottom-up regulatory regions (ps > .071). 
 
Figure 8: Direct paths from top-down to spontaneous recovery activity in regions-of-interest. 
Note. dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, vlPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, ant: anterior. 
Bars are differentiated between the Low and the High Spontaneous Recovery groups if 
significantly different. 
 
Top-Down Regulatory Activity to Spontaneous Recovery. Across the entire sample, 
left dlPFC activity did not predict spontaneous recovery (ps > .213). Right dlPFC activity to the 
CS+ predicted significantly greater spontaneous recovery in right amygdala (B = 0.15, SE = .06, 
z = 2.63, p = .009, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.26]), but right dlPFC activity to the CS- did not 
significantly predict spontaneous recovery (ps > .218). Left vlPFC activity to the CS+ predicted 
significantly greater spontaneous recovery in left anterior insula (B = 0.17, SE = .07, z = 2.61, p 
= .009, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.30]) and left BNST (B = 0.16, SE = .07, z = 2.16, p = .031, 95% CI = 
[0.01, 0.30]), while left vlPFC activity to the CS- predicted decreased spontaneous recovery in 
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left anterior insula (B = -0.21, SE = .07, z = -3.24, p = .001, 95% CI = [-0.34, -0.08]). Right 
vlPFC activity to the CS+ predicted increased spontaneous recovery in bilateral amygdala (left: 
B = 0.16, SE = .06, z = 2.67, p = .008, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.27]; right: B = 0.14, SE = .06, z = 2.46, 
p = .014, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.24]), bilateral anterior insular spontaneous recovery (left: B = 0.16, 
SE = .06, z = 2.50, p = .012, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.28]; right: B = 0.17, SE = .07, z = 2.61, p = .009, 
95% CI = [0.04, 0.30]), and right BNST spontaneous recovery (B = 0.20, SE = .08, z = 2.61, p 
= .009, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.34]). It also predicted marginally increased left BNST spontaneous 
recovery (B = -0.15, SE = .07, z = -2.09, p = .037, 95% CI = [-0.28, -0.01]). Right vlPFC activity 
to the CS- predicted decreased spontaneous recovery in bilateral anterior insula (left: B = -0.25, 
SE = .06, z = -3.99, p < .001, 95% CI = [-0.38, -0.13]; right: B = -0.40, SE = .06, z = -6.75, p 
< .001, 95% CI = [-0.52, -0.29]) and bilateral BNST (left: B = -0.15, SE = .07, z = -2.09, p 
= .037, 95% CI = [-0.28, -0.01]; right: B = -0.27, SE = .08, z = -3.56, p < .001, 95% CI = [-0.42, -
0.12]).   
For individuals with higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery, greater right dlPFC 
activity to the CS- (Wald χ2  = 4.48, p = .034; B = 0.28, SE = 0.12, z = 2.26, p = .024, 95% CI = 
[0.04, 0.53]) and insufficient right vlPFC activity to the CS- (Wald χ2  = 7.00, p = .008; B = -
0.36, SE = 0.14, z = -2.65, p = .008, 95% CI = [-0.63, -0.09]) predicted increased left amygdalar 
spontaneous recovery. Insufficient left dlPFC activity to the CS+ predicted greater right 
amygdalar spontaneous recovery (Wald χ2  = 4.32, p = .038; B = -0.34, SE = 0.14, z = -2.49, p 
= .013, 95% CI = [-0.61, -0.07]). Greater right vlPFC activity to the CS+ (Wald χ2  = 7.00, p 
= .008; B = 0.58, SE = 0.14, z = 4.01, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.30, 0.86]) and left dlPFC activity to 
the CS- (Wald χ2  = 5.00, p = .025; B = 0.47, SE = 0.16, z = 2.89, p = .004, 95% CI = [0.15, 
0.79]) predicted greater left BNST spontaneous recovery. Insufficient right vlPFC activity to the 
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CS- predicted greater left BNST spontaneous recovery (Wald χ2  = 7.07, p = .008; B = -0.54, SE 
= 0.14, z = -3.97, p < .001, 95% CI = [-0.80, -0.27]). Finally, greater right vlPFC activity to the 
CS+ predicted greater right BNST spontaneous recovery (Wald χ2  = 4.95, p = .026; B = 0.63, SE 
= 0.19, z = 3.31, p = .001, 95% CI = [0.26, 1.00]). All of these regulatory influences were not 
significantly present in individuals without higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery (ps 
> .055). 
 
Figure 9: Direct paths from bottom-up to spontaneous recovery activity in regions-of-interest. 
Note. vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex, sgACC: subgenual anterior cingulate, ant: 
anterior. Bars are differentiated between the Low and the High Spontaneous Recovery groups if 
significantly different. 
 
Bottom-up Regulatory Activity to Spontaneous Recovery. Across the entire sample, 
frontal vmPFC activity did not significantly affect spontaneous recovery (ps > .051). VmPFC-
sgACC activity to the CS+ predicted greater spontaneous recovery in bilateral amygdala (left: B 
= 0.61, SE = 0.11, z = 5.36, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.83]; right: B = 0.58, SE = 0.11, z = 5.46, 
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p < .001, 95% CI = [0.37, 0.78]). Insufficient vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS- also predicted 
increased spontaneous recovery in bilateral amygdala (left: B = -0.44, SE = 0.12, z = -3.55, p 
< .001, 95% CI = [-0.69, -0.20]; right: B = -0.25, SE = 0.12, z = -2.13, p = .033, 95% CI = [-0.47, 
-0.02]). There was no evidence of significant paths relating bottom-up activity with spontaneous 
recovery in bilateral anterior insula (ps > .104) or bilateral BNST (ps > .162). 
Individuals with higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery exhibited a marginally 
significant path such that greater frontal vmPFC activity to the CS+ predicted greater 
spontaneous recovery in right BNST (B = 0.30, SE = 0.16, z = 1.88, p = .06, 95% CI = [-0.01, 
0.61]), which was significantly greater relative to others (Wald χ2  = 5.04, p = .025; low SCR 
spontaneous recovery: B = -0.12, SE = 0.09, z = -1.35, p = .176, 95% CI = [-0.28, 0.05]). They 
also exhibited a significantly different (Wald χ2  = 4.65, p = .031), inverted, and non-significant 
relationship from vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS+ to left anterior insular spontaneous 
recovery (high spontaneous recovery: B = -0.35, SE = 0.25, z = -1.38, p = .166, 95% CI = [-0.85, 
0.15]; low spontaneous recovery: B = 0.25, SE = 0.13, z = 1.91, p = .056, 95% CI = [-0.01, 
0.52]). 
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Mediating Paths 
 
Figure 10: Significant indirect pathway for individuals exhibiting high levels of SCR 
spontaneous recovery. 
Note. dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex, sgACC: 
subgenual anterior cingulate, BNST: bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, CS: conditional 
stimulus. Reported as unstandardized B (Standard Error) * p < .05 
 
There was no evidence of indirect effects in the general sample (ps > .157) or within the 
low SCR spontaneous recovery group (ps > .088) to suggest that effects on spontaneous recovery 
by activity in top-down regulatory regions were mediated by bottom-up regulatory regions. 
Individuals with higher than average SCR spontaneous recovery exhibited a significant indirect 
pathway from right dlPFC activity to the CS+ to increased right BNST spontaneous recovery 
through vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS- (B = 0.14, SE = 0.07, z = 2.10, p = .036, 95% CI = 
[0.01, 0.27]). There was no significant total effect between right dlPFC to the CS+ and right 
BNST spontaneous recovery (p = .485), suggesting indirect-only mediation. 
Discussion 
 In this study we modelled fear spontaneous recovery by examining the activity of the 
neural network of regions implementing emotion generation and emotion regulation during a test 
of fear spontaneous recovery 24-48 hours after fear had been acquired. Our specified model of 
the interconnections between emotion and emotion regulatory regions suggests a 10.8% increase 
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in the variance explained over a naïve model with no assumptions and no differentiation between 
individuals who express high levels of autonomic SCR spontaneous recovery and individuals 
who do not. The model suggests evidence for robust pathways of emotion regulation. It suggests 
that abnormally expressed autonomic fear spontaneous recovery is not due to differences in the 
activity or the variability of activity of top-down emotion regulatory regions (i.e., dlPFC and 
vlPFC), differences in the activity of bottom-up emotion regulatory regions (i.e., frontal vmPFC 
and vmPFC-sgACC), or differences in the relations between top-down and bottom-up emotion 
regulatory activity. Furthermore, there were no differences found in the variance of neural 
spontaneous recovery activity in amygdala, BNST, or anterior insula. In our sample, participants 
were not instructed to regulate their fears, yet spontaneous recovery was not evidenced either in 
SCRs or neural activity. However, as we detail below, we found evidence for differential 
emotion generation, as well as regulation, misregulation, and regulatory conflict in individuals 
who did express higher than average SCRs at a test of fear spontaneous recovery. A 
disproportionate amount of those individuals were males. This model is likely to replicate for 
future samples, as it demonstrates good fit (.065) at the upper bound of the RMSEA 90% 
confidence interval. 
Emotion Generation 
There was no evidence of neural spontaneous recovery. Our data does suggest that the 
variability of amygdalar spontaneous recovery was less than that of BNST, suggesting that the 
spontaneous recovery of proximal fear responding is more stable on average than the 
spontaneous recovery of sustained fear responding. Intercorrelations between the spontaneous 
recovery areas suggest that greater return of proximal fear tends to coincide with greater return 
of sustained fear and greater interoception of the CS+ compared to the CS-. However, the 
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intercorrelations between amygdalar spontaneous recovery and BNST spontaneous recovery are 
sparse, limited only to between left amygdala and left BNST. This, coupled with the observation 
that the correlation between left amygdala and left BNST is the smallest in magnitude of the 
significant spontaneous recovery activations (B = .048, p = .03, 95% CI = [.004, .09]), suggests 
that the spontaneous recovery of proximal fear and the spontaneous recovery of sustained fear 
are relatively independent. 
Emotion Regulation 
Top-down regulatory areas were all significantly active to the CS+ and CS- relative to 
their implicit baselines. The greatest amount of activity, perhaps surprisingly, was generated 
from the right vlPFC toward the CS-, suggesting a strong general effort toward motor control 
when the safe cue was presented. This area was more active than left vlPFC or bilateral dlPFC 
activity toward the CS+, which are relevant for cognitive control, syllogistic reasoning, and 
stress regulation, all of which are putatively important aspects of regulation when presented with 
a threat. There was significant intercorrelation among top-down regulatory activities to the CS+ 
and CS-, with exceptions between right dlPFC and bilateral vlPFC. These areas coactivated 
toward either CS+ or CS-, but coactivated more sparsely otherwise, only correlating between 
right dlPFC to the CS+ left vlPFC to the CS-. 
Bottom-up regulatory areas of frontal vmPFC and vmPFC-sgACC were deactivated to 
the CS+ and CS- relative to implicit baselines when all top-down regulatory regions are inactive. 
Frontal vmPFC was more deactivated but more variable relative to the vmPFC-sgACC, These 
deactivations may suggest that on average, these areas are ceding the regulatory processing of 
the conditional stimuli to top-down areas, and activity relevant for extinction processing to the 
CS+ and CS- is more stable than activity relevant for the goal prioritization of CS+ and CS-. 
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Frontal vmPFC activity correlated with vmPFC-sgACC activity, suggesting that goal 
prioritization co-occurs in proportion with extinction processing to organize the perceptual 
import of the CS+ and CS-.  
Top-Down Influence on Bottom-Up Regulatory Activity. 
Goal Prioritization. Greater frontal vmPFC activity to the CS+ was associated with 
increases in left vlPFC activity to the CS- and with decreases in right dlPFC activity to the CS-. 
This suggests that cognitive control of the CS- increases the goal prioritization of the CS+, while 
stress regulation effort devoted to the CS- impedes the goal prioritization of the CS+.  
Extinction Processing. There were no significant top-down influences on vmPFC-
sgACC activity to the CS+, suggesting that activation from top-down regions do not influence 
the extinction processing of the CS+. Activity in bilateral dlPFC and left vlPFC was associated 
with vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS- suggesting that reducing stress regulation and cognitive 
control processing of the CS+ and increasing syllogistic reasoning and cognitive control of the 
CS- would predict a reduction of CS- extinction processing. 
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences on Spontaneous Recovery.  
Proximal Fear. Right dlPFC, right vlPFC, and vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS+ 
predicted significantly greater spontaneous recovery in amygdala, suggesting that greater stress 
regulation, motor control, and extinction processing to the CS+ signals the spontaneous recovery 
of proximal fear. Reductions in proximal fear spontaneous recovery was associated with greater 
vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS-. This may suggest that attention paid to the safety value of the 
CS- during extinction training may play an important role in the reduction of the spontaneous 
recovery of proximal fear. 
94 
 
Sustained Fear. Left vlPFC activity to the CS+ predicted significantly greater 
spontaneous recovery in left BNST, suggesting that the implementation of cognitive control on 
the CS+ may increase the spontaneous recovery of sustained fear.  
Interoception. Bilateral vlPFC activity to the CS+ predicted significantly greater 
spontaneous recovery in anterior insula, suggesting that cognitive and motor control processing 
to the CS+ predicted increases in CS+ interoception relative to CS- interoception. Right vlPFC 
activity to the CS- predicted a decreased difference between threat and safety interoception, 
suggesting that a motoric action plan downregulates internal, potentially fearful dialogues and 
the attentiveness to potentially fearful internal feeling states. 
Emotion Dysregulation 
Emotion Overgeneration. Our data suggests that high SCR spontaneous recovery 
coincides with an elevated level of baseline left amygdalar spontaneous recovery, which 
dovetails with the understanding that amygdala activity has a proximal relationship with skin 
conductance levels (Öhman & Soares, 1994). This suggests that the stage for the return of 
proximal fear is set, although the amount of spontaneous recovery estimated was not significant 
from zero without influence from regulatory areas. Taken together, these data suggest that high 
autonomic spontaneous recovery may ultimately have more to do with fear dysregulation than 
fear generation. 
Competitive Co-regulation. Individuals with high SCR spontaneous recovery exhibited 
an increased correlation of right vlPFC activity between CS+ and CS-, suggesting that for these 
individuals, the implementation of motoric regulation is applied across safe and threat stimuli.  
This is particularly important as right vlPFC activity, implementing motor control, was more 
associated with all estimates of spontaneous recovery: proximal fear, sustained fear, and 
95 
 
interoception. However, right vlPFC activity to the CS+ and CS-, while more positively 
correlated with each other, also predicted spontaneous recovery in opposite directions. This 
suggest that implementation of a similar motoric plan across stimuli may induce competitive co-
regulation. For such individuals there is perhaps a greater need for them to disassociate the motor 
strategy used to approach the two stimuli.  
Emotion Misregulation. Individuals with high SCR spontaneous recovery uniquely 
exhibited greater spontaneous recovery of proximal fear with greater right dlPFC activity to the 
CS-, suggesting that their stress regulation attempts toward safe cues are misregulatory and 
counterproductive. They also exhibited greater spontaneous recovery of sustained fear with 
greater right vlPFC activity to the CS+ and greater left dlPFC activity to the CS-, suggesting that 
their motor contingencies directed to threats and their syllogistic reasoning employed on safe 
cues serve to sustain fear. There was also marginal indication that greater spontaneous recovery 
of sustained fear was associated with greater frontal vmPFC activity to the CS+, suggesting that 
threat cues are perceptually mis-prioritized, although it is not clear through our current results 
whether it is over- or under-prioritized (and may in fact be person-specific). 
Individuals with high SCR spontaneous recovery also exhibited indirect stress 
misregulation toward threat cues, leading to increased spontaneous recovery of sustained threat. 
Indirect associations increasing spontaneous recovery in right BNST were found attributed to 
right dlPFC activity to the CS+ through decreased vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS-. Stress 
regulation of the CS+ was not associated with spontaneous recovery of sustained threat but it 
was associated with decreased extinction processing of the CS-. Since increased extinction 
processing of the CS- decreases the spontaneous recovery of sustained threat, reducing it through 
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increased stress regulation of the CS+ serves to indirectly increase spontaneous recovery of 
sustained threat. 
Underregulation and Disconnectivity. Individuals with high SCR spontaneous recovery 
showed disconnects in the relationship between left dlPFC activity to the CS- and right vlPFC to 
the CS+, between left dlPFC activity to the CS- and right vlPFC activity to the CS-, and between 
left vlPFC to the CS+ and right vlPFC to the CS-. All of this is to suggest that such individuals 
exhibit more widespread discordance in the top-down organization and conceptualization of how 
threat and safe stimuli relate after extinction training. These individuals also exhibited a 
reduction in the correlation between frontal vmPFC and vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS-, 
suggesting an impairment in the coordination between goal prioritization and extinction 
processing of the safe cue. 
Increased spontaneous recovery of proximal fear was predicted by insufficient left dlPFC 
activity to the CS+ and right vlPFC activity to the CS-, suggesting that for individuals that 
express high SCR spontaneous recovery, there needs to be improvements in their syllogistic 
reasoning about threats, and they need to implement a motoric plan when safe.  
In addition, increased spontaneous recovery of sustained fear was also predicted by 
insufficient right vlPFC activity to the CS-, again highlighting the importance of motoric 
regulation in the face of safety.  
Individuals with high SCR spontaneous recovery also exhibited disconnection between 
left anterior insular spontaneous recovery and vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS+. VmPFC-
sgACC activity to the CS+ marginally (p = .056) increased left anterior insular spontaneous 
recovery for individuals with low SCR spontaneous recovery. This may suggest that for most 
individuals, increased extinction processing of the CS+ (or at least the need to activate extinction 
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processing) was associated with greater interoceptive processing of threat, while this was not the 
case for individuals that express high SCR spontaneous recovery. 
Conclusion 
We found that expressed fear spontaneous recovery through SCR, an autonomic index, 
may be a result of abnormal proximal fear generation, but it is more likely accounted for by a 
mosaic of fear dysregulation patterns, characterized by the competitive co-regulation of fear 
interoception and sustained fear, general misregulation of proximal and sustained fear, and 
emotion underregulation or disconnection of regulatory activity on proximal, sustained, and 
interoceptive fear. Unexpectedly, we found that regulatory processing of the CS+ threat cue 
usually served to increase fear spontaneous recovery, calling attention to the fact that when 
participants are not instructed about how to think or act on threats, they may likely perform 
counterproductively. We also found that regulatory activity toward the CS- safe cue was the 
most direct pathway to downregulate fear spontaneous recovery, especially through bottom-up 
activity for the downregulation of the spontaneous recovery of proximal fear and through right 
vlPFC for the downregulation of fear interoception. 
The evidence presented here may implicate clinical conceptualization and clinical 
practice of treating fear and its spontaneous recovery. The model of fear and fear regulation 
presented is a reflection of activity soon after extinction-training, which may be similar to the 
activity profile of an individual that has completed exposure therapy. The profile of 
dysregulation, or parts of it, may reflect in behavior as predictive indicators for fear-disorder 
relapse. Therefore, a clinician should be wary of verbal indications of disorganized or 
misregulating conceptualizations of threat or safe stimuli, inadequate syllogistic reasoning 
around threats, and perhaps most importantly, motoric plans that are overgeneralized and fail to 
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discriminate threat from safety, or motoric plans that fail to address safety at all. The evidence 
also suggests that top-down approaches to safe cues are an underappreciated aspect of 
spontaneous recovery reduction or prevention in contemporary clinical psychology. Instead, 
individuals at risk for fear relapse, may benefit most from cognitive didactics and behavioral 
practices that promote adaptive motor control strategies and contingencies that regulate right 
vlPFC responses to threat and safety cues. 
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Figures 
 
Figures 11a and 11b: (a) Right and (b) left amygdala regions-of-interest defined by the Harvard-
Oxford MNI probabilistic atlas. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 12a and 12b: (a) Right and (b) left anterior insular cortex regions-of-interest defined by 
the Harvard-Oxford MNI probabilistic atlas. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Right and left bed nuclei of the stria terminalis regions-of-interest defined by Avery 
et al, 2015. 
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Figures 14a and 14b: (a) Right and (b) left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 5mm region-of-
interest spheres in blue centered on coordinates found in Fullana et al. 2016. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 15a and 15b: (a) Right and (b) left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 5mm region-of-interest 
spheres in blue centered on coordinates found in Fullana et al. 2016. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Ventromedial prefrontal-subgenual anterior cingulate cortices (vmPFC-sgACC) 
defined by the Harvard-Oxford MNI probabilistic atlas. 
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Figure 17: Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 5mm region-of-interest spheres in blue 
defined by Fullana et al. 2016 
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General Discussion 
“To perceive the world differently, we must be willing to change our belief system, let the past 
slip away, expand our sense of now, and dissolve the fear in our minds.” – William James 
The three studies in this dissertation assessed aspects of emotion regulation and emotion 
generation on the return of fear. Return of fear was examined through paradigms of rapid 
reacquisition (Study 1), fear reinstatement and context renewal (Study 2), and spontaneous 
recovery (Studies 1 and 2). We also attempted to elucidate the neural underpinnings of the return 
of fear through spontaneous recovery (Study 3). This series of studies sets the stage for a 
program of future investigations that bridge the neural, peripheral physiological, and self-report 
phenomenology of conditional fear learning and the return of fear. 
Within the framework of fear learning, we configured the cognitive reappraisal 
instruction featured in Studies 1 and 2 to be directed at the US-self relationship. Specifically, it 
asked participants to rethink the scream sound as syntonic to the goals of one’s role as a 
Hollywood movie director. Salience of the CS or the US was intentionally not targeted in order 
to preserve the prediction error required for reinforcing CS-noUS extinction memories. This 
study also importantly minimized the cost of cognitive reappraisal, in accordance with the 
computation implementation model of emotion regulation, by instructing the participant to take 
on the role of a movie director, presumably an easy thing to imagine especially for participants 
drawn from the southern Los Angeles area. Also, this cognitive reappraisal was not a distraction 
induction, as the instruction entailed paying close attention to the stimuli. One would presume 
that distraction would lead to a worsened fear trajectory, given that learning of the contingencies 
that lead to extinction would be disrupted.  
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The results of the experimental studies testing the effects of our low-cost cognitive 
reappraisal modestly supports its inclusion alongside extinction training for short-term fear 
amelioration, as it more quickly reduced CS- threat expectancies in two of the three experiments. 
This result was not observed in the experiment testing for the effects of context renewal. This 
may be because the test of spontaneous recovery in that experiment featured CS presentations 
with visual contexts, stimuli that is sufficiently distracting to mitigate the benefits of cognitive 
reappraisal. When translating these observations toward clinical application, two things are 
worth noting. The first is that cognitive reappraisal consistently did not evidence significant 
effects on fear responding to the CS+, so cognitive reappraisal does not directly enhance the 
extinction of conditional fear. The second is that the enhancements in the understanding that safe 
stimuli are safe, how one might interpret the faster reduction in threat expectancy to the CS-, are 
rather quite fragile. Even if they can be replicated in laboratory settings, given the sheer number 
of ecological distractors inevitable during exposure therapy in the clinic or elsewhere exposure 
may be indicated, we would be unlikely to see any short-term benefits of implementing cognitive 
reappraisal alongside exposure therapy. 
Cognitive reappraisal also showed very limited benefit for long-term fear amelioration, 
showing efficacy for the reduction of SCR spontaneous recovery in one out of three tests, and 
showing no evidence of efficacy in the reduction or prevention of rapid reacquisition, fear 
reinstatement, or context renewal. Taken together, this can be interpreted in a positive light in 
that cognitive reappraisal, at least the one designed in this set of studies, did not result in any 
deleterious effects, which might have been predicted by learning theory, purporting that 
cognitive reappraisal can adversely impact prediction error, leading to mitigated extinction 
learning (Vervliet et al., 2013). Rather, deleterious effects were observed consistently for the use 
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of emotion suppression in combination with extinction training, which dovetails with the 
literature frequently describing suppression as costly (e.g., Richards & Gross, 2000, 2000; 
Roberts, Levenson, & Gross, 2008; Srivastava, Tamir, McGonigal, John, & Gross, 2009), ironic 
(e.g., Ben-Naim, Hirschberger, Ein-Dor, & Mikulincer, 2013; Burns et al., 2008; Burns, 
Quartana, & Bruehl, 2007; Butler, Young, & Randall, 2010; Dalgleish, Yiend, Schweizer, & 
Dunn, 2009; Quartana & Burns, 2007, 2010; Quartana, Yoon, & Burns, 2007), exacerbatory 
(e.g., Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; Dennis, 2007; Langner, Epel, 
Matthews, Moskowitz, & Adler, 2012), and deleterious in general (Chapman, Fiscella, Kawachi, 
Duberstein, & Muennig, 2013; Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 2008). 
Despite the emotion regulation inductions, the pattern of data largely adhered to learning 
curves typical of the Rescorla-Wagner model. A single cognitive reappraisal strategy in the 
context of fear conditioning can take the form of re-evaluating the CS, US, the self, or any 
relation or set of relations between these. It is not clear if any one strategy is superior to another, 
and it remains to be seen how each form of reappraisal corresponds to the variables in the 
Rescorla-Wagner model. Given the reductions in fear due to the cognitive reappraisal instruction 
focused here, which was directed at the US-self relationship, this instruction may have reduced 
β, the associative value of the US, λ is the CS-US associative maximum, or both. A hypothesis 
whereby a US-self reappraisal is superior to a CS-targeted or US-targeted reappraisal, especially 
ones that may theoretically increase αx, β, or λ, should be explicitly tested. It will be worth 
understanding what types of cognitive reappraisals are useful and what types may potentially be 
detrimental to build a theoretical interface ontology between learning and evaluative 
terminology. 
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It may be that the cognitive reappraisal instruction used in Studies 1 and 2 lies within 
classes of multiple cognitive reappraisal strategies (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012). One 
criticism may be that the instructions used conflates a self-role reappraisal with a distancing 
reappraisal, and the effects may be mixed between the two types amongst participants. How a 
self-role reappraisal affects the fear response in this context may depend on the inherent value 
that the role of “movie director” may take, as this could be a simple neutral role shift, or a shift 
that takes on a positive valence as it mentally shifts one from a position of low-power in an 
undergraduate student to a position of high power. Other than sample differences in trait 
variables, such as personality or emotion regulatory habits, this may be underlying the mismatch 
in the effects of cognitive reappraisal on spontaneous recovery between Study 1 and Study 2. 
Future work should strive to better understand the role of cognitive effort on attention, as 
increased general cognitive effort may be driving enhanced learning of CS-noUS contingencies. 
The reasons why we observed unreliable efficacy of cognitive reappraisal on spontaneous 
recovery may be better understood from the neural perspective garnered from Study 3. Although 
in Studies 1 and 2, we designed a cognitive reappraisal that was hypothesized to target the US, 
we did not analyze how US activity predicted spontaneous recovery levels, so it is not known if 
this is the optimal pathway. However, it should be noted that our cognitive reappraisal strategy 
also reappraised the CSs as “photos of actresses” and it reappraised the CS-US relationship as 
“an actress’s scream”. Cognitive mechanisms of emotion regulation such as cognitive reappraisal 
are said to be “top-down” and implemented by high-order frontal brain structures such as the 
dlPFC and vlPFC. Learning mechanisms of emotion regulation such as extinction learning are 
said to be “bottom-up” and implemented by more ventral regions such as vmPFC and sgACC. 
Although Studies 1 and 2 suggest that although the regulation of fear may effectively result from 
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a simple low-cost cognitive reappraisal instruction, cognitive reappraisal may not be used if 
uninstructed and the results of Study 3 dovetails with this with potential explanation as to why.  
Without instruction, the data from Study 3 suggests that activity in right dlPFC and right 
vlPFC (along with vmPFC-sgACC) to the CS+ increased neural activity in amygdala at a test of 
spontaneous recovery. For individuals who expressed levels of autonomic spontaneous recovery 
that was higher on average, there was evidence that a regulatory pathway through right dlPFC 
toward the CS+ indirectly upregulated sustained fear spontaneous recovery by decreasing 
vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS-. Taken together, this discourages the CS+ targeting of 
cognitive reappraisal.  
The data from Study 3 also suggests that neural processing of the CS- in service of 
reducing fear spontaneous recovery may be underappreciated. Reductions in amygdalar 
spontaneous recovery was associated with greater vmPFC-sgACC activity to the CS-. 
Furthermore, we observed that individuals expressing higher than average autonomic 
spontaneous recovery exhibited hypercorrelated activity between the CS+ and CS- in the right 
vlPFC, which is posited to be involved with the planning of goal-directed motoric planning. This 
suggests that there was a more similar motor response to the CS+ and CS- planned within those 
individuals relative to individuals who exhibited a healthier spontaneous recovery profile. Right 
vlPFC activity to the CS+ and CS- competitively co-regulate amygdalar spontaneous recovery, 
as right vlPFC activity to the CS+ increased amygdalar spontaneous recovery, whereas right 
vlPFC activity to the CS- decreased amygdalar spontaneous recovery. A natural hypothesis that 
emerges from this would be that perhaps the most effective cognitive reappraisals for individuals 
who exhibit high levels of spontaneous recovery disassociates motoric plans between the CS+ 
and CS- and implements a motoric plan specifically directed at the CS-. To extend our 
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Hollywood director example, we may instruct participants “log in your mind instances when you 
do not hear a scream, because that should go against your decision to hire her.” 
The analysis of Study 3 uses structural equation modelling, which implies causal 
effective connectivity relationships between regions. However, the nature of the estimated 
associations in this model cannot be deemed causal due to the study design. We observed that 
many of the direction of effects from regulatory regions to fear implementation regions as 
modelled were in the positive direction, which suggests that regulatory areas typically increase 
emotional activity when participants are uninstructed. Notably, the results reported are also 
general associations between emotional and regulatory neural activity with stimulus presentation 
within a relatively long time-span. This strategy is similar to analytical strategies employed in 
other studies (Fullana et al., 2016; Milad et al., 2005), but it shares the weakness that it is unable 
to tease apart the temporal dynamics of these relationships. Although the hypotheses center on 
relationships such that stimulus properties would produce activation in fear regions followed by 
influences by activation in regulatory regions, alternative interpretations are that our estimates 
may represent how fear region activations produce regulatory region activations, or how stimulus 
presentations produce activation in both fear and regulatory regions simultaneously. Future work 
proposing different SEMs, or using such methods as psychophysiological interaction (PPI) 
analyses, can help tease out these explanations by supplying evidence as to whether a 
relationship between the BOLD activity between regulatory and fear regions differ between the 
CS-types, and if interregional connectivity is interactive versus independent. Beyond the static 
modelling of PPI and SEM, dynamic causal modelling (DCM; Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003) 
may provide evidence for a more exact model of information flow through the brain between 
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regulatory and emotion regions than the one assumed in Study 3 using systematic model 
comparison. 
Studies 1, 2, and 3, broadly recorded indices of conditional fear autonomically through 
skin conductance responding, reportably through the continuous assessment of US expectancy, 
and intermittently through self-reports of fear, valence, and arousal. Many more methodologies 
are available and were not assessed, such as reaction time recording to threatening stimuli, 
electroencephalogram, and fMRI. This type of broad application of methodologies to index 
conditional fear might be required to uncover unobvious benefits and detriments and to better 
specify the dynamics of using clinical interventions that modulate simultaneous combinations of 
psychological (e.g., cognitive restructuring, mindfulness, behavioral activation). However, such 
an approach should first be viewed as exploratory, requiring follow-up observations to uncover 
the granular elements and processes that underlie unobvious changes in outcomes such as 
conditional fear. 
The current work provides the foundation for a program of research that aims to elucidate 
the neural, peripheral physiological, behavioral, and reportable links that manifest the return of 
fear and its interaction with attempts at self-regulation. Future work can utilize the experimental 
manipulations in Studies 1 and 2 in the fMRI scanner to examine how different emotion 
regulatory strategies direct impact the neural network of activations in the frontal regulatory-
emotion generation system outlined in Study 3. Further work can re-examine this activation 
network in the contexts of return of fear phenomena other than spontaneous recovery, namely, 
rapid reacquisition, fear reinstatement, and context renewal. Furthermore, future work that 
follows the themes of (1) clarifying the costs of enacting cognitive reappraisal, (2) clarifying the 
effects of specific classes of reappraisal on fear, (3) clarifying the effects of reappraisal 
109 
 
properties such as cost, value, and target, and (4) mapping the constituent elements underlying 
reappraisal and suppression to the formulas of Rescorla-Wagner and the computational 
implementation model will be important next steps for a field of optimizing fear regulation. Such 
a research trajectory can elucidate combinable mechanisms that accelerates fear extinction and 
reduce or prevent the return of fear. 
Clinical Research and Translation 
Zooming out to a clinical translational model for fear extinction as outlined by the model 
described by Craske, Hermans, & Vervliet, (2018), these studies are steps forward in the 
elucidation of cognitive-emotional processes that moderate fear extinction (see Figure 1). These 
studies also advance a nomological net connecting inhibitory regulation with the disconfirmation 
of expectancies, and the attention to feared stimuli components of optimizing exposure therapy 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1: Translational model for fear extinction adapted from Craske et al., 2018 
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Figure 2: Extinction-derived strategies for optimizing exposure therapy adapted from Craske et 
al., 2018 
 
It is unclear whether inducing purer constituents underlying cognitive reappraisal 
instructions of Study 1 would improve the fear trajectory or translate well clinically. However, it 
is important to know how these constituents work, for example, to know what cognitive 
reappraisal classes are appropriate to combine for crafting clinical interventions. This is 
especially in light of the fact that cognitive restructuring in a clinical setting is unlikely to consist 
solely on one, or even centered on one strategy. A clinician treating a dog phobic, over the 
course of a single visit, may say “most dogs will not bite you” (a CS-not bad for me reappraisal), 
“you are overestimating the probability of these bites” (CS-US contingency reappraisal), “and 
you are overreacting to the consequences of a bite” (US-not as bad for me reappraisal), “so what 
would you say to your friend if your friend was afraid of dogs?” (distancing and self-role 
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reappraisal). Furthermore, examining how cognitive reappraisals work as interventions involving 
a dyadic relationship must take relational aspects into account, such as communicative delivery 
(e.g., tone and prosody) from the interventionist, and individual differences of the client such as 
their communicative receptiveness and cognitive rigidity. 
Beyond cognitive reappraisal and extinction training, other combinations targeted at the 
fear response may play a role, and should be induced and tested. This might include such factors 
as physiological change through relaxation, breathing exercises, or biofeedback. The role of all 
these regulatory factors speak to the important and dynamic role that clinicians and clinical 
technologies such as apps or devices to aid in mental health play in the intervention. That is, 
addressing fear amelioration appropriately will require, the appropriate “recipe” or emotion 
regulatory strategies that ensures the modulation of appropriate psychophysiological outcomes 
should be prepared and induced when appropriate.  
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